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



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



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A world of ideas on public policy.

Improving Access to Innovative Medicines

by Henry A. McKinnell, Jr., Ph.D.

Trends of the past few years have drawn a great deal of attention to the research-based pharmaceutical industry, both positive and negative. On the positive side, the discovery of breakthrough medicines is making it possible to effectively treat an ever-wider range of health conditions. Increasingly, the substitution of new therapies for less effective and more invasive treatments *reduces the cost of being healthy* to individuals, to healthcare systems, and to society. As a result of advances in pharmaceutical therapy, people have choices and opportunities for healthy living that were previously unavailable.

The increasing use of medicines, however, has also led to increasing concerns about the affordability of new treatments. The growth in *spending* on prescription drugs has often been mistaken for growth in prescription *prices*. For the most part, spending has risen not because of rising prices but because the quantity of medicines people use has increased substantially. Furthermore, as advances in science such as the decoding of the Human Genome lead to further discoveries, and as the world's population ages, pressure for even greater use of medicines is likely to continue. A key challenge of the future will be to assure continued progress in discovering treatments for disease, while at the same time assuring access to needed medicines.

As the world's leading pharmaceutical research company, Pfizer takes a serious interest in these issues. We are concerned for the uninsured and those who cannot afford the medicine they need. We believe that the affordability of medicines must be addressed in a way that will allow people access to needed medicines while at the same time maintaining the incentive to search for new and better treatments and cures. While these issues are appropriately addressed by society at large, we recognize that we have a role to play as well.

> ***Pfizer believes that people who need medicines should be able to obtain them, and we believe that a variety of creative public policies and private approaches can improve access without stifling innovation***

Pfizer has a history of introducing our valuable new medicines at reasonable prices and of implementing only modest annual price increases. Over the past decade, after accounting for discounts to federal government buyers and Medicaid, Pfizer's annual price increases in the United States have averaged less than the annual rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. Furthermore, in our global pharmaceuticals business, price change has on average been responsible for only a 1.2% increase in our annual revenues over the past five years. Volume growth has been substantially larger, underscoring the fact that what we have seen in the past few years is an explosion in the use of valuable medicines rather than in their prices.

Pfizer also has a strong tradition of providing our medicines to those with the greatest need. Our *Sharing the Care* and patient assistance programs provide our medicines at no charge to more than a million patients in the U.S. each year. Internationally, we are providing medicine, logistical support, medical expertise and training to address the critical healthcare needs of people in developing countries. And until a policy solution is enacted to address the need for improved coverage for seniors, we have established the *Pfizer for Living Share Card*, which is designed to help low-income U.S. Medicare beneficiaries who lack drug coverage. Patients in the U.S. whose income is at or below twice the federal poverty level may receive one-month prescriptions of most of Pfizer's medicines for only $15. Further information about this program can be obtained by calling, toll free, (800) 717-6005 or on the Internet at www.pfizerforliving.com. Although we recognize that this program does not provide a complete solution to the problem of inadequate coverage, we believe it is a promising model and we applaud other companies who have joined us in establishing similar programs.

We believe that people who need medicines should be able to obtain them, and we believe that a variety of creative public policies and private approaches can *improve* access without *stifling* innovation. However, finding these solutions will require new thinking and new approaches. We are committed to participating not only in the search for cures, but also in the search for policy solutions on which the health of current and future generations depends.

Henry A. McKinnell, Jr., Ph.D. is chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Pfizer Inc.

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

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Bird's Eye

Karl Zinsmeister

Old And In The Way

In April of this year, I was asked by the State Department to give a presentation on American culture at a large conference of European academics, government officials, and businessmen held in Warsaw, Poland. The event was sponsored by a major German foundation, and there were hundreds of Germans and Poles in attendance, plus smaller numbers of Brits, Scandinavians, Dutch, and other Europeans. There were barons and sirs and Danish executresses in microskirts and fey Frenchmen and Italian journalists sucking cigarettes as if a firing squad awaited—the whole panoply of Eurocharacters, set among the old buildings, gray skies, jammed streets, creaky plumbing, odd haircuts, high expenses, and cramped horizons that characterize so much of Europe today.

To my knowledge I was the only American participating. This was an occasion for Europeans—Germans especially—to talk frankly to other Europeans. The panel on which I spoke was chaired by Reiner Pommerin, a professor at the University of Dresden, colonel in the German air force reserves, and advisor to the German Ministry of Defense. My fellow speakers included Germany's former ambassador to the U.K., the current German ambassador to Poland, a DaimlerChrysler managing director, and a professor from Britain. We were to focus on transatlantic relations.

Throughout the two days, Pommerin set the tone with an aggressively antagonistic attitude toward all things American. "Thank God we had the 11th of September," he declared—for this showed the U.S. how it feels to be humbled. Herr professor-colonel went on to suggest that Americans often feel nostalgic for the "good old days of slavery in the nineteenth century." He told ludicrous stories about seeing empty bottles and litter piled "one meter deep" along roadsides in America, illustrating our environmental slovenliness. He insisted the seemingly mighty U.S. military was now a hollow force, all flash and no substance.

Picking up on this, another panelist stated with authority that most Microsoft products, and indeed most American technologies generally, are junk, and have come to dominate world commerce solely through manipulative trade and advertising. These McProducts will be dashed, he suggested, once Europe gets its high-tech sector (which was sound asleep last I checked) in gear with superior European engineering. A short while later, a British professor pronounced doom on yet another of our industries, insisting gravely that America is going to be wholly uncompetitive in the biological sciences because "hardly any U.S. college students accept the reality of evolution," and science teaching in the U.S. "blinds students with dogmatism." No mention of American kids showing up at school barefoot in patched overalls, though I was ready for that.

Much of this would have made me laugh out loud, except that the vehemence and envy and certitude with which it was pronounced gave the proceedings an extremely ugly texture. Plus, these were European movers and shakers, not a bunch of pastry chefs. So it wasn't ignorance I was hearing. It was animus, jealousy, and willful spite.

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With this experience under my belt, I wasn't the slightest bit surprised when the German elections this fall turned to high-stakes Yankee-bashing. First, Germany told the U.S. it wouldn't supply evidence against Zacarias Moussaoui (the "missing" September 11 hijacker) because he might get the death penalty. Then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder loudly vowed to obstruct further U.S. anti-terror efforts in the Middle East, for instance by pulling Germany's useful chemical-weapons-detecting vehicles out of Kuwait.

An "adventure" is how Schröder characterized President Bush's plans. This within a year of the snuffing out of 3,000 American lives in a single day by Middle Eastern radicals, and within weeks of when we would learn that North Korea has developed a nuclear bomb, while Saddam Hussein, killer of one million people, many of them with chemical weapons, could be just a few months or years from having one of his own. Schröder's fervor was such that he announced Germany would resist any plan to disarm Iraq even if the U.N. fully sanctioned the effort.

Riding this anti-American hobby-horse with all his might, Schröder shot forward in German popularity. (After he saw the dividends Schröder reaped by dumping on the U.S., the chancellor's election opponent echoed a similar line, promising he would "never" let Americans use German bases for Middle Eastern raids.) In the end, despite being highly unpopular for his economic failures, Schröder scrambled back into Germany's top office—by planting his feet firmly on Uncle Sam's face.

Apparently one of those shining men who thinks he should be able to trade in a wife of 40 for two of age 20, Schröder is currently on his fourth marriage, so he is obviously not a man known for his loyalty. What's important in this case is not his personal perfidy, though, but rather his confirmation that European politicians can now rack up public opinion points by practicing anti-Americanism.

During his first trip to Europe in 2001, President Bush was hectored and attacked repeatedly by activists and politicians. When in the spring of 2002 the President visited Berlin, tens of thousands of Germans gave him the cold shoulder in more than 25 large anti-U.S. demonstrations. The mayor of Berlin announced he would leave town during the visit of America's leader.

The European press labeled our President a "murderer" for allowing the execution of Timothy McVeigh. Euro politicians and reporters have taken to casually calling Americans "toxic," "thugs," "imperialists," and "gangsters." In 2001, Europeans conspired to get the U.S. removed from the U.N. Human Rights Commission, offering our seat instead to Sudan and Libya, those paragons of liberty. European politicians have recently attacked and undercut the U.S. on North Korea, on the Middle East, over the Afghan war, about prisoners at Guantanamo, at multiple environmental conclaves, regarding the International Criminal Court, in scores of trade battles, on missile defense, and at other occasions too numerous to count. Schröder simply fanned this flame to revive his faltering campaign.

And it is by no means just the Germans who are exhibiting hostility toward the U.S. Even Britain, our supposed "special partner" in Europe, has gotten thoroughly swept up in the resentment game. I happened to be in London on America's Independence Day this year, and opened the English newspapers to find headlines like this one in the *Daily Mirror*—"Mourn on the Fourth of July: The USA is now the world's leading rogue state."

Chelsea Clinton, currently pursuing a master's degree at Oxford, and hardly a rabid flag-waver, wrote an article shortly after September 11 complaining that "Every day I encounter some sort of anti-American feeling. Sometimes it's from other students, sometimes it's from a newspaper columnist, sometimes it's from 'peace' demonstrators." Despite Tony Blair's sturdiness, more Britons say in the latest polls that they disapprove of America's war on terror than approve it. Today, 53 percent of the British name Europe as their closest ally, compared to a third who choose the U.S. Two decades ago, that was reversed.

Europeans, already worried they won't be able to keep up with America, are now panicking as the U.S. coalesces, post-September 11, into an even steelier colossus.

When New York City Democrat Ed Koch appeared on a BBC television program at the one-year anniversary of the Twin Towers attacks, he was called a simple-minded buffoon for defending the U.S. Here is a representative response from the BBC Web site: "The fact is that one of the reasons why the U.S. got bombed on September 11th was as a result of the U.S.'s heavy-handed and misguided approach in its foreign policy—which has created a lot of anger worldwide." The Londoner who wrote that has much company across her continent: In a study by the Pew Research Center two months after the attacks, fully 66 percent of a group of European elites stated that Europeans believe it is "good for the U.S. to feel vulnerable."

This simple reality needs to be faced squarely by Americans: In a great variety of areas—foreign policy, demography, religion, economics—Americans and Europeans are growing apart. While the September 11 attacks deepened American sobriety, patriotic feeling, and national resolution, in Europe they merely created one more flashpoint for division. European elites, already worried they won't be able to keep up with America over the next generation, are now approaching panic as the U.S. coalesces, during its September 11 recovery, into an even steelier and more determined colossus.

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Some Europeans complain that the U.S. is more and more heading off on its own without them. They are right. America's psychic link with Europe, I suggest, is fading extremely rapidly. Keep in mind that there are currently 32 million people living in the U.S. who were born abroad, and very few of these new Americans are from Europe. For two generations now, the new blood flowing into the U.S. has come primarily from Asia, Central and South America, the Near East, and the Caribbean. America is becoming a cosmic nation, comprised of all peoples, rather than just an offshoot of Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War Americans have felt much less intertwined with Europeans, and at least as interested in China, Mexico, India, and the Middle East as we are in Europe. We recognize that those are the relationships which will grow in importance, while Europe will slowly fade in the rear-view mirror, its greatest accomplishments behind it.

For everyday, non-political Americans, Europe is simply not a preoccupation one way or the other. It is Canada with castles, as one acquaintance puts it—a nice place, but hardly the furnace where our future will be forged. Given our fundamental belief that each person and nation should be free to solve their own problems, average Americans are perfectly content to have Europeans go their own way. If the Euros think welfare statism and E.U. regulation is their ticket to prosperity, they're welcome to try. If they believe they're safer without a ballistic missile shield than with one, we say Godspeed to them.

But Americans, as I told the audience in Warsaw, claim this same independence of national direction for themselves. And in many particulars Americans now have very different ideas on how best to achieve prosperity and peace. Where overlaps and mutual benefits can be negotiated between the European course and American goals, by all means let's make our policies coincide. But otherwise, let a thousand flowers bloom.

If Europeans want to ban the death penalty, that's fine with Americans; but don't ask us to follow the same dictate. If Europeans think selling military technology to North Korea and Iran, and helping Libya and Iraq with their oil industries is a good idea, expect not a shred of support from the U.S. If Europeans believe their determination to send billions of dollars to Yasser Arafat is likely to speed peace in the Middle East, we won't stop them.

If enough of these divergences accumulate, however, Americans may eventually be forced to conclude that, as economist Irwin Stelzer has put it, many European nations "are ceasing, or may have already ceased, to be our friends."

The U.S. will never be *hostile* to Europe; there are too many links of kinship and shared purpose for that. But neither do I expect the U.S. will have especially warm relations with the E.U. 15 or 20 years hence. Our commonalities are fading, and the feelings of solidarity that were so strong amidst World War II and the Cold War are now fading like winter leaves.

One of the wedges forming between the U.S. and Europe is the European Union. The E.U.'s encouragement of a centralized soft socialism puts it on a very different course from the U.S. The unmistakable current in the U.S. over the last generation has been to *reduce* centralism and the size of government: When Ronald Reagan swept onto the scene in the early 1980s, U.S. federal spending was 24 percent of Gross Domestic Product. Today it is 19 percent. That is only half or two thirds the level in most E.U. states, where levels have been rising, not falling.

The U.S. has undergone an even more profound decentralizing revolution outside of government. Many private corporations and organizations have broken themselves into smaller governing units to avoid stultification. Brand-new firms like Cisco, Southwest Airlines, Amgen, Microsoft, and Nucor, most of them beginning as tiny businesses unconstrained by bureaucracy, have used their decision-making freedom to out-

Europeans resent U.S. economic success because it reminds them that their own preferred cocktails of state subsidy and intervention constrict growth.

flank older champions. Sitting high on current lists of the richest Americans are at least a couple dozen billionaires who made their fortunes in companies that didn't even exist 25 years ago. In Europe, hardly any of the top companies are recent startups.

The U.S. has also decentralized physically, with new nodes of power and wealth sprouting all across our continent. Outlying cities like Charlotte, Fargo, Phoenix, Austin, Manchester, and Omaha have become economic dynamos. Widened prosperity and new communication technologies have made it possible for America's most productive workers to live where they choose. The U.S. is completely unlike European states—where power is almost always concentrated in one great city. If you want to be part of the action in France, you must be in Paris; in England, it's London. In America, by contrast, people and wealth are increasingly dispersed throughout the country. We may hope that entry into the E.U. of the Eastern Europeans (who have experienced the dark side of statism) will moderate Europe's centralizing mania, but that remains to be seen.

It isn't just differing policies that are splitting the E.U. from the U.S. It is also sheer competition. The very idea of forming a united states of Europe comes in large measure from a desire to keep up with America. Today, "much of the psychological drive for Euro-nationalism is provided by anti-Americanism," notes John O'Sullivan, one of the contributors to our symposium on

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page 30. During his term as president of the European Union, the prime minister of Sweden Goran Persson insisted that functioning "as a balance to U.S. domination" was Europe's most important role. The view of many European leaders is that "whatever diminishes the stature of the United States is of benefit to Europe," states Jeffrey Gedmin (another of our symposiasts). Many of the economic choices, cultural initiatives, and foreign policy decisions being in Europe today are animated by simple competitive envy.

Americans must be clear-eyed about this. When we had differences with European governments in the past, it was usually some exceptional matter which could be negotiated away. Given today's foaming desire of European unionists to form a superstate to compete with the U.S., splits will be less accidental in the future, and harder to rub away. "It would be a misreading of Europe's political elites to see anti-American complaints as isolated gripes which can be overcome, one by one, through patient dialogue," warned Michael Gove, a perceptive editorialist for London's *Times*, when I visited his office. "Europe is not begging to differ in particulars, but beginning to diverge in fundamentals."

The philosophical differences between Europe and the U.S. are reflected and magnified in three critical structural breaks: 1) Europe has surrendered much of its economic dynamism. 2) Europe has lost its stomach for military action, substituting an exaggerated confidence in diplomacy. And, 3) Europe is on a path to population collapse.

First economics. We have conventionally thought of Europe as having about the same standard of living as Americans. This is less and less true. For the European Union as a whole, GDP per capita is presently less than two thirds of U.S. levels. America's poorest sub-groups, like African Americans, now have higher average income levels than the typical European.

What's behind this? For one thing, Americans work harder: 72 percent of the U.S. population is at work, compared to only 58 percent in the E.U. American workers also put in more hours. And U.S. workers are more productive—an E.U. worker currently produces 73 cents worth of output in the same period of time a U.S. worker creates a dollar's worth.

The locomotive of Europe is the German economy, which has been in a serious mess for more than a decade. Germany's annual growth rate over the past ten years has been a limp 1.4 percent. Among the major industrial nations, only Japan (a true basket case) has done worse. The German labor market has become one of the most inflexible and uncompetitive in the world, which is why unemployment has been stuck at 9-10 percent for years, even amid a global economic boom.

Germany is the European champion for subsidies to business, but that hasn't stopped the national capital of Berlin from losing 300,000 industrial jobs since 1990. Berlin now staggers, bankrupt, under a municipal debt of $60 billion. (The city's entire annual budget is $20 billion.) German welfare programs have grown so onerous that only 57 percent of worker pay now goes into worker pockets; the other 43 percent goes to taxes.

One stark indicator of Germany's declining global economic significance is this: The share of international exported goods bought by Germany fell from 10.7 percent in 1991 to just 7.7 percent in 2001. During that same period, the U.S. increased its share from 14.0 to 18.7 percent.

German sclerosis is one reason why the collective European economy is growing at 1 percent as this year comes to a close, while the U.S.—despite the blows it has absorbed over the last two years—is close to 3 percent. (If you think America's recent bear market in stocks has been ugly, check out Europe's. At the time when our Dow Jones Industrial Average was down 23 percent, indexes for the French, Dutch, and German stock markets were down 32 to 43 percent.)

Over the long haul, these sorts of disparities add up to crunching economic divergences. Since 1970, America has produced 57 million new jobs. The E.U. nations, with an even bigger population, have produced 5 million (most of them with the government). A startling 40 percent of the unemployed in Europe have been out of work for more than a year, compared to only 6 percent in the U.S.

Another telling indicator of economic stagnation in Europe is the fact that many or most immigrants to that continent end up on welfare. In the U.S., almost all immigrants grab entry-level jobs, frequently more than one, and work their way up the economic ladder. The easy availability of work—indeed, our economy's insatiable hunger for additional laborers—is the main force that attracts immigrants to the U.S. in the first place.

Even corners of Europe that have resisted excessive government manipulation of the economy are now being dragged toward the statist norm by E.U. rules. Recently the European Court of Justice ruled that British employers must give all part-time workers four weeks of paid vacation, to align their policies with the rest of the European Union. In an effort to guarantee the "good life" by government edict, French, German, Dutch, and other continental finaglers have mandated short work weeks, long vacations, and fat social services, which has driven all dynamism out of their economies.

If no visible alternative loomed, citizens might not realize that better ways of achieving prosperity exist. But any European with eyes can observe that the United States makes very different economic choices, with very different results. Here is one root of the resentment felt by European elites, who would otherwise have a free hand to mold their societies according to their own visions. "The anti-American alliance," noted Michael Gove in

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the London *Times* earlier this year, "resents American economic success because it reminds them that their preferred cocktails of protectionism, state regulation, subsidy, and intervention constrict growth. America's practical success is a standing rebuke to their abstract beliefs."

A second divergence splitting Europe from America is defense strategy. When it comes to guarding the peace, current European leaders put all their faith in the endless talk, commissioneering, and resolution-writing of collective diplomacy—what they call "multilateralism" (a term nearly as feeble as the concept). Given Europe's history with the Treaty of Versailles, Neville Chamberlain's Munich Agreement, a biological weapons "ban" secretly violated with impunity by the Soviets and scads of other signatories, plus many more recent failures of "let's pretend" diplomacy in places ranging from Iraq to Rwanda to Bosnia, it's inexplicable that Europeans would bet all future peace on the security of parchment walls. But that's exactly what they're doing.

Charles Krauthammer diagnoses the problem this way: "After half a century under the American umbrella, West Europeans have come to believe that their freedom is self-generated. It is by now, they feel, a simple birthright, as natural as the air they breathe. When they see the United States slaying dragons abroad—yesterday Afghanistan, today Iraq, tomorrow who knows who—they see a cowboy whose enthusiasms threaten to disturb the perfect order of things, best symbolized by the hushed paper-shuffling at the International Criminal Court."

China, Mexico, India, the Middle East—these are the relationships that will grow in importance, while Europe fades slowly in the rear view mirror.

At the same time they've bet the farm on swiss-cheese treaties, the Europeans have pared their military spending to the point where the entire continent now has approximately the same force-projecting power as the Swiss navy. (See our lead item in SCAN documenting the collapse of our allies' strength.) American military spending now totals more than the next *nine* largest national defense budgets combined. Even more significantly, the U.S. now pays for almost 80 percent of the world's military R & D.

Without admitting it, the Europeans have essentially decided to rely on the U.S. to keep them safe. American taxpayers are paying to build a missile defense system, an unchallengeable air force, and a fleet of 13 separate supercarriers with attendant air wings and naval battle groups. Europeans are concentrating on producing richer foie gras, art museums, and corporate subsidies. They could do much more to help guard the West without straining themselves.

Contrary to Euro myth, America isn't strong because it buys guns instead of butter. Military spending represents only 3 percent of U.S. GDP today. That's down from nearly 7 percent in the 1980s, a level we could return to almost instantly if any serious threat required that. America is powerful militarily simply because it is a highly productive nation, and utterly devoted to defense of its homeland.

Excellent technology and heavy training allow the U.S. to get a great deal of military bang for the buck. But the deepest root of America's military preeminence is her demonstrated willingness to commit substantial resources to national defense over a long period of time. Roughly 40 percent of all global defense spending is currently put up by the U.S. That's what wore out the Soviets. That's what put Milosevic in handcuffs. That's what got Kuwaiti oil flowing again. That's what turned out the lights on the Taliban. That—and that alone—is what's going to prevent an Iraqi nuclear device from exploding over Tel Aviv or London.

Until Europe demonstrates an equivalent willingness to commit its sons and its treasure to national defense, all talk of building a formidable independent military force in Europe is merely hot air. Wishful thinking will not man and equip a carrier battle group, build a missile shield, or otherwise instill the necessary awe in the world's tyrants.

Of course, most European elites deny such measures are necessary. To quote my British friend Mr. Gove again: "Europe's leaders seek to manage conflict through the international therapy of peace processes, the buying off of aggression with the danegeld of aid or the erection of a paper palisade of global law, which the unscrupulous always punch through. Europeans may convince themselves that these developments are the innovations of a continent in the van of progress, but they are really the withered autumn fruits of a civilization in decline."

A final, crushing, structural divergence separating America and Europe is demography. Birth rates in Europe have been catastrophically low for two decades. Europe is thus getting old and starting to shrink. The U.S. remains a youthful and fast-growing nation.

It takes 2.1 lifetime births per woman just to keep a population stable over the long run. Today, German women are having less than 1.4 children each—only two thirds the level needed to maintain zero population growth. Italians and Spaniards are at a shockingly low rate of 1.2 lifetime births per woman. The E.U. as a whole is far below the level needed simply to replace its current population.

The social, economic, and geopolitical ramifications are stark. At current fertility rates, Germany's total population

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will shrink from 82 million to 67 million over the next 50 years. Italy will tumble from 58 to 39 million people. Over that very same period, the population of the U.S. (where the birth rate is more than half-again as high) will go from 283 to 410 million.

And it isn't only the raw numbers that will change; the *composition* of the population will also shift dramatically. As births remain below the replacement level year after year, and old people live longer and longer, a geometric spiral forms, and a society becomes elderly. By the end of my expected lifespan in the 2030s, fully *half* of all Germans will be over 50. Italians will be even older—half over 54. (The U.S., by comparison, will have a median age in the upper 30s.) The European Union will be a very gray place, and within its boundaries every single employed individual will have his own elderly person 65 or older to provide for through the public pension system. This is not a recipe for an energetic society.

Europe's disinterest in childbearing is a crisis of confidence and optimism. It is a spiritual indicator, reflecting millions of individual decisions to pursue self interest and material well-being instead of participating in the human future. These individual decisions will have profound collective effects.

Keep in mind that just 100 years ago, when my own grandmother was born, the U.S. was a modest nation of 76 million people. Just Germany and Poland combined had more citizens than America. Europe was the undeniable world center of science, military power, arts, and intellectual innovation of all sorts.

Today the respective positions are very different. The U.S. now produces 30 percent of global GDP; as recently as the late 1980s the figure was just 22 percent. Fully half of all Internet traffic takes place in America. Three quarters of all Nobel laureates in science, medicine, and economics have lived and worked in the U.S. in recent decades. Given the very different population trends on either side of the Atlantic, America's lead will only widen in the future.

It's quite possible that in coming decades the European Union could simply lock up. The wrong-headed pressures toward centralization and state bureaucracy, the sheer cumbersomeness of its political mechanisms, the wide cultural gaps papered over by the union, could eventually lead to meltdown. How such a collapse might unfold is anybody's guess, but the possibilities are worrisome.

To American eyes, the most striking aspect of the European Union is its undemocratic nature. The E.U. apparatus is exceedingly closed and secretive. Relatively few of the confederation's important decisions are currently made by democratically accountable officials. On front after front, bureaucratic mandarins are deciding how everyday Europeans will live (see our feature article on page 36).

Many Europeans, in a way Americans find impossible to understand, are willing to let their elites lead them by the nose. There is a kind of peasant mentality under which their "betters" are allowed to make the important national judgments for them. "Europe's leaders see themselves as wise parents, and their citizens as children," explains journalist and Briton Clive Crook. "In France, Germany, and the institutions of the European Union, elites take major political decisions and impose them on the voters without consulting them," summarizes John O'Sullivan. "Political elites feel that the people have no right to obstruct the realization of the European dream."

What happens to such a system of governance if things go wrong and popular unrest bubbles up is not clear. But the history of earlier multinational collectives in Europe, like the Hapsburg and Tsarist empires, Napoleonic France, the Third Reich, the Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia, is not soothing. And even if ethnic blow-ups could be avoided, a withered Europe would not be a good thing. Among other effects, "a weakened Europe is likely to grow more resentful toward America," warned British journalist Charles Moore in a lecture to the New Atlantic Initiative last year, "rather than blaming themselves."

Though a nasty flame-out is conceivable, I will close with a less alarmist yet blunt prediction about Europe's likely future. Fifty years hence, when my oldest children approach retirement, I expect that today's European dream of achieving economic and military superpower status will be a dim memory, and that some more realistic alternative will have replaced it.

At that point, under current trends, the largest Western European country—Germany—will rank about 23rd on the list of the world's biggest nations. Europe as a whole will contain in the neighborhood of 360 million people and falling. Americans will be at 550 million and rising. The U.S. economy will have grown to more than twice the size of Europe's.

I expect that Americans and Europeans will be reasonably amiable. We will vacation and attend college in each other's countries, and (one hopes) trade as easily as Canada and the U.S. do today. But it will be China, India, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, Vietnam, the Arab world, and Turkey that the U.S. will have to huddle with most earnestly at important international conclaves—not Europe.

That is, frankly, not the circumstance most Americans would prefer. By rights, Europe and America ought to remain close cousins. But Europe's current choices in politics, economics, social and family life, and moral reasoning unmistakably suggest that a less familial relationship is emerging.

That is a reality that America needs to prepare for.

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Sidelights

"Now that we have premium cable do we really need all these books?"

Norwegian rock band Taliban Airways marked the anniversary of 9/11 with a concert entitled Hit Another Tower. ··· In her September 11, 2002 sermon, Presbyterian minister **Gretchen Graf**, of Grand Forks, North Dakota said that the 9/11 hijackers committed "an act of faith and courage, a carefully planned statement against what they saw as the evils of a corrupt and oppressive nation. They were willing to give their lives so that the world would see their outrage." ❧ At a morning prayer service, Harvard president **Larry Summers** told the audience that while "anti-Semitism and views that are profoundly anti-Israeli have traditionally been the primary preserve of poorly educated right-wing populists, profoundly anti-Israel views are increasingly finding support in progressive intellectual communities. Serious and thoughtful people are advocating and taking actions that are anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent." ❧ **Jesse Jackson** told Baltimore radio audiences that to get **Saddam Hussein**, America is "going to have to kill a lot of innocent people.... It's reminiscent of biblical times—killing all those children to get to Jesus." ··· Iraqi-born teenager **Hussein Mohammed** told London's *Daily Telegraph* that he was "against Saddam because he doesn't have a heart for any people. I think he should be attacked. I'd rather have America than Saddam." He was quoted while marching in a European anti-war rally. ❧ According to a report in *Time*, American Taliban **John Walker Lindh** took homosexual sex romps with his Muslim comrades. ··· An English Islamic group issued a death *fatwa* against playwright **Terrence McNally** because the London stage production of his play *Corpus Christi* depicts Jesus Christ as a homosexual. ❧ At a press conference in Rome, **Steven Spielberg** told reporters that "If **Bush**...has reliable information on the fact that Saddam Hussein is making weapons of mass destruction, I cannot *not* support the policies of his government." ··· Actress **Jessica Lange** told Spanish audiences she hates President Bush. "I despise him and his entire administration—not only because of its international policy, but also the national." ❧ A recent report found that African Americans are 50 percent more likely to try to start their own business than are whites. ❧ Mayor **Vera Katz** of Portland, Oregon declared the week of August 3 "Leather Pride Week." Mayor Katz stated the "motto of 'Safe, Sane, and Consensual' adopted by the leather and fetish communities is vital to all relationships between consenting adults." ··· Animal-rights activist **Eric Ward** runs a Web-based business specializing in leather-free S & M goods such as harnesses and restraints. The enterprise carries the endorsement of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.

According to reports from Eurostat, the European Statistics Agency, inflation for nations using the euro is rising. August brought the annual rate to 2.1 percent, up from 1.9 percent in July. ··· Swiss scientists have concluded that euro coins are more likely to cause allergic reactions than the currencies they replaced. ❧ A French publisher was forced to withdraw the novel *Rose Bonbon* after a flood of protests. The book was told from the point of view of a homicidal pedophile. ❧ According to the *Observer*, Britain's National Health Service is prescribing vibrators to women who lack sexual desire. One doctor claims 50 percent of women have some sort of sexual dysfunction. ··· A Swedish legislator called for pornography to be televised all day on Saturdays in an effort to reverse the nation's declining birth rate. ❧ A 12-year-old student in Charlottesville, Virginia was suspended for wearing an "NRA Sports Shooting Camp" T-shirt, because it featured images of three target shooters.

❧ Students at California's San Mateo High School recently formed the Satanic Thought Society. ❧ The U.N. Human Rights Committee upheld a French ban on dwarf-tossing. The law had been challenged by **Manuel Wackenheim**, who argued the law prevents him from making a living by being tossed in discos and nightclubs.

—*BB*

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Scan

OUR WEAK FRIENDS

As the United States prepares for another war against Iraq, it's high time to look at the military readiness of our closest allies. The view is not pretty.

Since the end of World War II, no nation has fallen further than America's neighbor to the north. Canada has a proud military tradition: Its troops stormed Juno Beach at D-Day, and it maintained more than 300 ships in its navy and one of the world's largest armies well into the 1950s. But five decades of government neglect have destroyed a once mighty military.

Although Canada's per capita GDP sits squarely in the middle of developed countries (about 80 percent of that of the U.S.), Canadian military spending stands at less than $265 per capita—the worst among major NATO members. (NATO countries average $589 per capita in annual military spending, while the U.S. spends a little over $1,000.) Today, the Canadian navy has only 34 ships, and just 12 of them can keep pace with an American battle group. Canada has no strategic airlift capacity, and so must disassemble and reassemble tanks and helicopters when they need to be sent overseas. Canada even relies on American help to move troops around to cope with its own domestic emergencies like floods and ice storms. Our northern neighbor also has no space command, and has declined offers to participate in America's missile defense plans, a cagey, if cheap, move: Almost all Canadian population centers lie within 150 miles of the U.S. border, so American missile defense will protect Canada anyway.

Worse yet, Canada has essentially stopped air and sea patrols around its coastline, the world's longest. Smugglers already run rampant, and terrorists can't be stopped either. "We have sovereignty over the arctic areas only by the grace of other nations," says Rob Anders, a member of Parliament who serves as defense critic of the opposition Canadian Alliance Party. "It's a huge problem."

The situation isn't much better across the Atlantic. European defense spending averages much less than American levels (see chart), and many of Europe's military forces—including important ones like Germany—are growing pitifully weak as a result. Only the U.K. has the ability to transport more than a handful of troops anywhere outside its borders and keep them supplied. Even there, massive problems exist. In the last year alone, the Territorial Army (Britain's equivalent of the National Guard) lost nearly a quarter of its personnel. France, which spends more heavily on defense than any other European ally, has little ability to project force around the world. Its only modern aircraft carrier went into operation just last year, after almost a decade of delays.

NATO's new members in central and eastern Europe spend reasonably heavily on defense, but mostly on antiquated force structures and Soviet-era equipment. Much of Europe's defense spending goes to keeping large numbers of semi-skilled soldiers under arms, rather than providing modern equipment or high-tech training. Europe has also ceased most advanced defense research. Although the E.U.'s economy is almost as big as America's, E.U. nations received only 11 percent of all high-tech patents in 2000 (about half of them in the U.K.); over 56 percent went to the United States.

"Collectively, Europe spends a little more than half as much as the U.S. does on defense. If they had even half the capacity, that would be pretty good," states Radek Sikorski, head of AEI's New Atlantic Initiative and a former Polish deputy defense minister. "But instead, Europe has maybe 10 percent of America's capacity." Sikorski argues that Europeans should stick with things they can do well. The U.K. might put its strong naval tradition to work, while Denmark and Poland could focus on peacekeeping operations.

In the long run, the world's security depends on all Western democracies remaining strong enough militarily to protect themselves and the global rule of law. Right now our allies aren't doing their share.

MILITARY SPENDING, 1997

	per capita	as % of GNP
United States	$1,030	3.3
Canada	257	1.3
Australia	459	2.2
France	708	3.0
Germany	401	1.6
Italy	395	2.0
Poland	145	2.3
Spain	196	1.5
U.K.	600	2.7

Source: U.S. Department of State

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DOUBLE-STANDARD DEMOCRATS

Democrats resisting President Bush's call to remove Saddam Hussein from power insisted we should not go to war with Iraq unless we had United Nations support. Their underlying principle seems to be that only the U.N. can bestow moral legitimacy on American military action against other nations.

Only a few years ago, however, amidst the war in Kosovo—which manifestly did not have the blessings of the United Nations—many of those same Democrats were gung-ho, the U.N. be damned. A friend in the White House recently put together this quick inventory:

- Senator Paul Wellstone favored the non-U.N. sanctioned war in Kosovo
- So did Representative David Bonior, who not only wanted to use air strikes, but also to deploy ground troops
- Senator Joseph Biden demanded an air campaign against Milosevic by a "date certain"
- Senator Barbara Boxer said, "I support the NATO action and I think we need to stick with it"
- Senator Tom Daschle told reporters "I think that military action and diplomacy sometimes work hand in glove"
- Senator Carl Levin, who as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee now wants legislation that would prohibit the use of force against Iraq without prior U.N. approval, counseled just three years ago that given Milosevic's "history of broken promises" the world should be "skeptical" of U.N. weapons control agreements, and that it was "essential" military strikes take place if "Milosevic does not live up to his commitments."

At that same time, President Clinton argued that no authorizing U.N. Security Council resolution was necessary for military action. And the Dutch ambassador to the U.N. criticized "one or two [Security Council] members' rigid interpretation" in demanding U.N. approval before any bullets could fly.

Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic have similarly murderous records of disregarding U.N. resolutions, but Saddam's crimes have been far more numerous and deadly. And with his insatiable appetite for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, and his record of being listed as a state sponsor of international terrorism by both the Clinton and Bush administrations, Saddam is a threat to U.S. peace and security in a way that Milosevic never was.

So what is the explanation for the Democrats' double-standard? Could it be that a Republican President counts as a bigger enemy than foreign tyrants?

THANK YOU, BILL CLINTON

"North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. We have to be very firm about it," President Clinton declared on "Meet the Press" on November 7, 1993. Now we learn the North Koreans went ahead anyway. Is anyone really surprised that particular Commander in Chief didn't dissuade them?

Charles Krauthammer sure isn't. Back in 1993 he bemoaned, in his syndicated column, that Clinton's entire foreign policy was built on the principle of "talk loudly and carry a big carrot." This soon "degenerated into nothing but carrots: offers of diplomatic recognition, trade, aid, and most important of all, cancellation of U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises." In exchange, the North Koreans offered Clinton "inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear complex by the International Atomic Energy Agency."

But "inspections of self-declared sites are a joke," Krauthammer warned. "We know from our experience with Iraq that a country bent on developing the bomb can comply fully with regular IAEA inspections and build a massive nuclear program undetected." The place to sign a goodies-for-a-baddie deal like the one Clinton offered North Korea, Krauthammer suggested in early 1994, "is on the deck of the battleship Missouri" because "it is unconditional surrender."

Clinton's State Department characterized the 1993 collapse to the Koreans as "very good news." Clinton himself bragged of his efforts "to reach out and reason with North Korea." But "reaching out to the unreachable and reasoning with the unreasonable," Krauthammer warned at the time, "is futile."

We now know who was right. Unfortunately it's too late, and Americans must face another grave threat to their lives. Thanks to the weakness of Bill Clinton.

A FULL-BLOWN FRUIT AND NUT CASE

Michael Newdow, the atheist who filed suit to prevent the Pledge of Allegiance from being recited in his daughter's classroom, has recently taken up a new cause: A public campaign to rid the English language of masculine and feminine pronouns. He would have us replace "he" and "she" with the gender-neutral "re." "His" and "hers" would become "rees," and "him" and "her" would have to be "erm."

THIS IS A PROBLEM?

Erika Harold is a 2001 Phi Beta Kappa college graduate of mixed black and American Indian ancestry who can sing arias in six languages. She is headed for Harvard Law School. But first she will spend a year travelling the country making public appearances as Miss America 2003.

Pageant winners must promote a favorite cause during their annual reign, and Ms. Harold had a ready-made issue, one she has already spoken about to more than 14,000 students during her time as Miss Illinois. Her cause, born of deep personal experience in schools where her life was threatened because of

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her refusal to succumb to sexual advances, is teen sexual abstinence. "Thousands of young people," she states, "need assurance that waiting until marriage for sex is the right thing to do." Harold promotes the value and wholesomeness of teen chastity under the title "Respect Yourself, Protect Yourself."

Only one problem: The Miss America organizers didn't want to hear it. At one of her first functions, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., pageant officials told her she could not talk about abstinence. "Quite frankly…there are pressures from some sides to not promote abstinence," was her answer to reporters asking what had happened to the message she was so closely associated with as Miss Illinois.

In the face of a backlash from the public, including 38 Congressmen who rallied to her defense, the restrictions on Ms. Harold's message were lifted in mid October by Miss America chief executive George Bauer and other officials. "I will not be bullied. I've gone through enough adversity in my life to stand up for what I believe in," stated Ms. Harold.

THOSE DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FOLK

People who give to religious causes also give generously to secular causes. In fact, they are apt to give substantially more to non-religious groups than those who only give to secular organizations, according to a new national study of giving and volunteering ("Faith and Philanthropy," www.independentsector.org).

Households that gave to congregations and secular groups donated more than three times as much ($2,247) as households that contributed solely to non-religious organizations ($623). The religious households' donations to secular causes was approximately 20 percent more than that of their non-religious counterparts. Overall, households that donated to religious groups accounted for 88 percent of all charitable contributions.

"It's a rather dramatic proof that people who give to religion are vital in supporting the other sectors of the independent sector," said Chris Toppe, research analyst with the Independent Sector. Indeed, religious givers out-gave other givers in all categories, from education and the arts to the environment.

Religious givers don't stop at the offering plates. People of faith are much more likely to volunteer their time than those who don't attend religious services. Fifty-four percent of those who regularly attend services volunteered—while only 32 percent of non-churchgoers gave of their time. Furthermore, frequent churchgoers—29 percent of all Americans—accounted for nearly 70 percent of the hours volunteered each month.

—*summarized in the* San Jose Mercury News



"Honey, you'll never guess what happened! On my way home from work, I was corrupted by several obscure but powerful special interest groups!"

HELD HOSTAGE

Miguel Estrada came to the United States when he was 17 years old, speaking only rudimentary English. Within five years he graduated magna cum laude from Columbia College in New York. Then he earned a law degree, again with high honors, from Harvard. He's worked at the Justice Department in both Democratic and Republican administrations, is a member of one of the most prominent law firms in the country and has won two thirds of the cases he argued before the U.S. Supreme Court.

Estrada proved he could succeed on his own, without racial or ethnic double standards or the patronage of leftist advocacy groups. That makes him automatically suspect. In the words of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Estrada "has lived a very different life from that of most Latinos—a life isolated from their experience and concerns."

Oh really? Let's see, he came here as an immigrant, like about one out of every two adult Hispanics. He worked hard, as do most Hispanics, who have among the highest labor force participation rates of any group. And he succeeded, brilliantly. I have a feeling that it's this part of Estrada's life story that these groups have a problem with. After all, aren't Hispanics supposed to be laggards according to liberal victimology, needing a never-ending series of government programs in order to eke out a meager existence? This liberal racism, wrapped in phony compassion, is the most pernicious kind.

Estrada proves the lie to much of the Left's stereotypes of Hispanics, and they can't stand it. Worse, they worry that if Estrada makes it onto the D.C. Circuit, he will likely become the first Hispanic nominated to the Supreme Court. This is a plum slot the Democrats hoped to reserve for one of their own, which explains the abominable actions of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT).

As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Leahy has refused for the past year and a half to give Estrada so much as a simple hearing. He has engaged in unprecedented efforts to dig up dirt on Estrada—unsuccessfully. Even the liberal American Bar Association gave Estrada the highest judicial fitness rating by unanimous vote. His critics have only one thing against Estrada—that he is a conservative. And every lib-

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eral partisan believes that Hispanic and black conservatives must be squelched.

Leahy's obstruction has placed the nominee in a kind of professional limbo, limited his fellow senators' right to advise and consent on judicial nominees, denied the President his Constitutionally mandated authority to appoint judges, and deprived the nation of a first-rate jurist. Miguel Estrada has been held hostage by liberal interest groups for too long.

—**Linda Chavez** *is a syndicated columnist.*

POLITICAL PORK

A naval officer who is a *TAE* subscriber e-mailed us recently to express his surprise, upon opening his Florida Absentee Ballot this year, at finding the following on the ballot:

Constitutional Amendment #10
Limiting Cruel and Inhumane Confinement of Pigs During Pregnancy

> Inhumane treatment of animals is a concern of Florida citizens; to prevent cruelty to animals and as recommended by The Humane Society of the United States, no person shall confine a pig during pregnancy in a cage, crate, or other enclosure, or tether a pregnant pig on a farm so that the pig is prevented from turning around freely.

A Constitutional amendment? Do Floridians have too much time on their hands?

And how many confused Palm Beach residents do you suppose will vote for this, then complain they thought they were voting for the freedom of activists to wiggle freely while gestating their pet causes?

RATIONALIZING BIAS

The stunning research presented in our September issue, documenting a gross imbalance between conservative and liberal faculty members on college campuses, stirred up enormous interest, inspiring numerous TV news shows, an ABC segment by George Will, *Wall Street Journal* coverage, and a *U.S. News* column by John Leo.

Many professors, however, either shrugged their shoulders in the face of this hard evidence, or resorted to smug attempts to explain away campus discrimination against non-leftists. The following reaction from Duke University professor Lawrence Evans ran in the *Raleigh News & Observer* on September 23:

> So John Leo and the (oh so diverse!) *The American Enterprise* magazine think there is insufficient diversity of political affiliation among university faculty. Their numbers show that Republicans are a small minority of the professoriate. True, and rightly so.
>
> In seeking faculty, universities look for people who can analyze and discuss matters of some complexity, who are unafraid to challenge the wisdom of simple solutions, and who have a sense of social responsibility toward those who cannot buy influence. Such people tend to be put off by a political party dominated by those who believe dogmatically in the infallibility of the marketplace as a solution to all economic problems, or else in the infallibility of scripture as a guide to morality.
>
> In short, universities want people of some depth, subtlety, and intelligence. People like that usually vote for the Democrats. So what?

Quite a display of academic depth, subtlety, and intelligence, no?

Meanwhile, most colleges continue to promote only the most superficial sorts of "diversity" on their campuses—primarily oriented toward skin color, rather than ideas and principles. Brown, one of the Ivy League universities, recently announced it was "seeking to create a senior-level position to promote diversity on campus and help the school identify and hire more minority faculty." According to news reports, "The administration is still figuring out a specific job description, but the idea is finding a vocal proponent who can enunciate the concept and spread it to students, faculty and other branches." In other words, a racial agitator. No mention of interest in breaking up the one-party thinking that has made most campuses such oppressively mono-minded fortresses of left-wing ideology.

FIGHT CAMPUS DISCRIMINATION

Meanwhile, two national groups are making concrete efforts to improve political balance on campuses. One is FIRE, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, which has resisted the imposition of academic speech codes and campaigned for greater tolerance of non-left viewpoints at colleges.

A second is the Center for the Study of Popular Culture, which has recently published a useful pamphlet, "You Can't Get A Good Education...If They're Only Telling You Half the Story." In addition to providing an overview of political imbalances at universities, it contributes one very specific bit of fresh evidence documenting academic discrimination—a survey of commencement speakers at seven representative schools: Harvard, UC-Berkeley, U. Penn, Wellesley, UNC, Drew, and the University of Michigan.

Among 70 different individuals invited to deliver commencement addresses at those institutions over a decade, fully 58 were clearly identifiable leftists (like Hillary Clinton, Marian Wright Edelman, Donna Shalala, Mario Cuomo, Gloria Steinem, Madeleine Albright, Whoopi Goldberg, Al Gore). A grand total of *three* were Republicans or conservatives (Christine Todd Whitman, Alan Greenspan, and John McCain).

In concert with several other organizations, the Center for the Study of Popular Culture promises to gear up a "Campaign for Fairness and Inclusion in Higher Education" this fall.

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A CONSERVATIVE READING LIST

As our combined boon-to-self-education and aid-to-Christmas-gift-shoppers, here is a book list for the mind and soul. It is drawn from the final chapter of Dinesh D'Souza's new book Letters to a Young Conservative, *just out.*

To be an educated conservative, you have to be familiar with the "best that has been thought and said." Here, then, is my list of the most important works produced in the past half century that a young conservative should read. It includes books written by conservatives, as well as books by writers who would not call themselves conservatives—like Margaret Mead and George Orwell—that discuss themes important to conservatism. I have kept the list brief, because life is short.

Robert Bork, *The Tempting of America* (1990): The single best critique of liberal jurisprudence, and an argument for interpreting the Constitution by consulting the intentions of the framers.

Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987): A great teacher's learned account of how our best young minds came to the conclusion that there are no truths.

Patrick Buchanan, *Right From the Beginning* (1988): A pugnacious and absorbing account that shows the attractions, and weaknesses, of the author's tribal conservatism.

Whittaker Chambers, *Witness* (1952): A profoundly personal and deeply moving account of one man's liberation from the shackles of communism.

George Gilder, *Men and Marriage* (1986): An iconoclastic argument for why "women's liberation" produces angry women and emasculated men.

Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962): Capitalism's most powerful advocate in recent decades makes his case for the free market.

Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (1944): This hugely influential book showed the similarities between communism and fascism and made one of the first and best defenses of libertarian individualism.

Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims* (1981): A devastating account of the gullibility and outright stupidity of prominent liberal intellectuals who made pilgrimages to Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Castro's Cuba.

Harry Jaffa, *The Crisis of the House Divided* (1959): Through an examination of the Lincoln-Douglas debates this book offers deep and subtle reflections on the exercise of political statesmanship.

Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot* (1953): A broad survey of the intellectual breadth of conservative thought, with a special emphasis on Edmund Burke.

Irving Kristol, *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea* (1995): Learned and incisive essays by a former liberal who was "mugged by reality" and moved right.

Peter Laslett, *The World We have Lost* (1965): This study of England before the Industrial Revolution shows the virtues, and the limitations, of the world that was transformed by technological capitalism.

Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (1949): Why capitalism works and socialism doesn't, by the great man of Austrian economics.

Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (1949): A comprehensive and politically incorrect survey of sex differences and their social consequences.

Charles Murray, *Losing Ground* (1984): One of the best arguments against the welfare state, this book became the intellectual blueprint for welfare reform.

George Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945* (1976): A useful historical account of how American conservatism went from obscure philosophizing to a mainstream political movement.

Peggy Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution* (1991): A revealing book that tells the reader a lot about Reagan, and a lot about Peggy.

Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (1962): The limits of social engineering and of rational blueprints for society, elegantly advanced by the English philosopher.

George Orwell, *Animal Farm* (1946): A parable about the totalitarian temptation embodied in socialism.

Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged* (1957): A fast-paced novel that is also a capitalist manifesto; it celebrates the entrepreneurs who build and make new things.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (1974): A devastating indictment of Soviet communism, and a story of one man's spiritual triumph over the gulag.

Thomas Sowell, *Ethnic America* (1981): One of Sowell's many books refuting the presumption that discrimination is the main reason why ethnic groups succeed or fail.

Shelby Steele, *The Content of Our Character* (1990): A revealing look at the psychological underpinning of affirmative action and other race-based policies.

Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (1950): One of conservatism's most important philosophers makes an eloquent defense of natural right against the twin currents of relativism and historicism.

Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (1952): A learned, sometimes cryptic, account of liberalism as the modern version of an old Christian heresy.

Evelyn Waugh, *Brideshead Revisited* (1944): One of the great novels of the twentieth century makes the case against the twentieth century.

Richard Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences* (1948): The Southern Agrarian diagnosis of the ailment of Western civilization—the decline of belief in an abiding moral order.

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Forward Observer

James Glassman



Greens Eat Organic Pears, Africa Starves

What my colleagues Chistopher DeMuth and Steven Hayward have christened "romantic environmentalism"—the view that protecting the environment must override all other concerns—emerged as a big loser at the giant U.N. Earth Summit in Johannesburg during September. The winner was economic development.

After all, decades of academic research shows that clean air and water are byproducts of prosperous economies. In Johannesburg, poor countries said they wanted to get rich. To get there, they need cheap, abundant energy—not the windmills and solar cells the Europeans want to foist on them. Expensive, exotic energy sources are fine for Denmark and France, but not—at least now—for Mozambique and Bangladesh.

The conference was not a complete rout, though. While failing to achieve their romantic vision on energy, the Europeans managed to impose an unscientific perspective in another economic sphere—agriculture. Four years ago, Europe slapped a moratorium on any further approvals of genetically modified (G.M.) food products. Americans have been eating G.M. corn, potatoes, and soybeans since the mid 1990s with no adverse consequences. Europeans themselves have had no safety or health problems with the nine G.M. products approved between 1994 and 1998.

In fact, the European Commission's own environmental ministry has indicated it opposes the moratorium. Still, governments of individual European countries have decided to pander to the Greens, who share power in many shaky governing coalitions. As a result, genetically modified foods have been blocked in all of Europe.

Europeans led the agricultural revolutions of the past. Today, much of Europe wants to stop the clock on food progress. That's fine for them—Europe is rich—but their superstition badly hurts the world's poor.

Genetic techniques have sped the development of crops that are resistant to pests, that grow faster, that can tolerate bad soils, that don't require as much fertilizer. As a result, about 40 percent of America's corn crop and 70 percent of its soybeans now come from G.M. seeds. Sensible environmentalists like G.M. crops—because they help preserve land, reduce fertilizer use, and keep chemicals out of streams.

The European moratorium, however, has stopped G.M. farming in places like Africa. Why should Africans make an investment in superior G.M. plants if they will be prevented from selling them to a prime export market like the E.U.?

Of course, Africans can still use the improved crops at home to feed themselves, can't they? Not necessarily. Greenpeace and other extreme environmental groups have focused desperately on keeping the African continent bio-tech free, spreading horror stories in the process. So far, they are succeeding.

The result is that people may be dying unnecessarily. As a famine spread in southern Africa last summer, 13 million people risked starvation. The U.S. pledged 490,000 metric tons of food for the drought-stricken region; about one third of it genetically modified corn. But the president of Zambia—under pressure from Green groups, and worried that if any of the corn were planted it might make his country's crops ineligible for export to Europe—actually turned down the food aid. So corn piled up in warehouses next to starving people.

Andrew Natsios, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, blasted the European environmental romantics during the Earth Summit:

> I have never seen, in my 30 years of public service, such disinformation and intellectual dishonesty.... It's frightening people into thinking there is something wrong with the food [and] slowing the famine relief in a very disturbing way.

There is more than just environmental romanticism and aversion to sound science behind this. Europeans also have a desire to beat Americans at agri-business by using non-tariff trade barriers. And it's not just Americans who lose in the process. Genetic technology could eventually allow Africans and Asians to compete with European farmers. Fearing the political power of the farm lobby and the Greens, European politicians would rather placate their former colonies with handouts than buy their goods.

As a result, the danger of Africans suffering and dying because they're denied the latest modern technology is much higher than it ought to be.

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



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- ☐ Mary Lefkowitz—"Afrocentric Fairy Tales"
- ☐ Allan Bloom—lecture on the novel *Madame Bovary*
- ☐ George Will—"The Problem with Populism"
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Grover Norquist

Five Easy Steps to Tax Reform

Before September 11 of last year, Social Security reform sat at the center of the Bush administration's economic agenda. The war, a plummeting stock market, and resistance from congressional leaders, however, has most likely postponed Social Security reform until after the 2004 elections. So now the administration has signaled another issue for its big push in 2003: fundamental tax reform.

The drive to cut and simplify taxes has been building momentum within the GOP for two decades. In 1981, President Reagan won a 25 percent cut in marginal income tax rates. This supply-side trim was sold as an economic stimulus package to create jobs, wealth, and increase government revenues. (It did all three.)

Then the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduced America's top tax rate to 28 percent, while eliminating many deductions and credits. The capital gains tax, though, was destructively raised from 20 to 28 percent. In 1990 and 1993, Bush Senior and then Bill Clinton raised personal income tax rates to 39.6 percent.

George W. Bush's 2001 tax cut was not sold as a supply-side economic stimulus. While Reagan had promised to *increase* government revenues via the economic growth his tax reductions would bring, Bush's message was much more fundamentally conservative. Bush the younger warned that Congress would spend the surpluses then overflowing Washington unless the money was returned to individual taxpayers.

Back in the mid 1990s, the flat tax debate caught fire, as reflected in Steve Forbes' 1996 Presidential campaign and the speeches of House Majority Leader Dick Armey. Then a quiet fell over the debate, and conservative activists began to ask, "Whatever happened to the flat tax? Why don't we talk about it any more?"

But the flat tax didn't die: It became a consensus issue that lay dormant as long as a Democratic President had the veto at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. That barrier has now fallen.

There are two routes to a single-rate tax. For one, the President or a Congressional leader could draft a flat income or sales tax and present the entire package to the country for approval. The second route is what tax reformer Ernie Christian calls "The five easy pieces." If we eliminate the estate tax, stop taxing capital gains, end the Alternative Minimum Tax, make all savings tax free, let businesses write off investments in a single year rather than forcing them to depreciate expenditures over a long period, and then charge everyone the same rate, we will have a flat tax, Christian says.

This five-step program has the advantage that each of its elements has its own built-in constituency, while support for an official flat tax is far more diffuse. Farmers, homeowners, and small businesspeople have already convinced Congress to do away with the estate tax. Similar cajoling is taking place around the other five steps. My organization, Americans for Tax Reform, has established caucuses in Congress for each of the separate reforms. The coalition of groups supporting the Zero Capital Gains Tax, for example, now includes the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the National Restaurant Association. The 107-member caucus is led in the Senate by Georgia Democrat Zell Miller and Alabama Republican Richard Shelby and in House by California Republican David Dreier and Texas Democrat Ralph Hall.

Ohio Republican Rob Portman, who has championed expanding IRAs and 401(k)s, leads a caucus to protect all savings from taxes. Texas Republican Kay Bailey Hutchison and Pennsylvania Republican Phil English lead the caucus to abolish the Alternative Minimum Tax for both individuals and businesses. In this fashion, the building blocks of the "five easy pieces" strategy are already in place. It will run parallel to the Bush administration's efforts next year.

And even if tax eliminators win only a few of the battles, it will be a major move in the right direction. What Mae West said of sex is true of tax cuts: All tax cuts are good tax cuts. Even bad tax cuts are good.

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

To help his class understand the role old Route 66 played in the past, Mr. Walk's students created murals, brochures and interviewed residents, which helped them experience a part of local history. State Farm is proud to present Fred Walk with the Good Neighbor Teacher Award and also donate $10,000 to Normal Community High School in Normal, Illinois.

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"Live with TAE

A prominent British editorialist and conservative takes a pessimistic look at the future of an increasingly centralized and socialist Europe.

Peter Hitchens

There is something about the Hitchens family that breeds controversialists with deft pens. The British expatriate Christopher Hitchens is one of America's most coruscant essayists; brother Peter, a Trotskyite turned Tory, has emerged as one of England's sharpest critics of the United Kingdom's absorption into the European Union. Peter, a columnist for the Mail on Sunday, *is the author of* The Abolition of Britain, *an elegy for a land which he believes to be disappearing under the assault of junk culture, sexual immorality, and European homogenization.*

TAE editor in chief Karl Zinsmeister and associate editor Bill Kauffman interviewed Peter Hitchens at his home in Oxford.



Capitalism and socialism are quite capable of coexisting in a country. The only thing you have to sacrifice is liberty.

TAE: You've said that the European Union has far more in common with the old Soviet Union than it does with the USA. Those are strong words for a former Moscow correspondent.

HITCHENS: The E.U. is a top-down creation, an elitist idea with its roots in the branch of European social democracy whose features were internationalism, a loathing of the nation-state, a belief in the benevolent intervention of the state in almost all areas of life, and a belief that capitalism untamed was necessarily evil. Remember that many of the founders of the Soviet Union were well-intentioned and didn't mean to end up where they did.

In the late 1980s, many socialists in the United Kingdom switched from being fervent opponents of what was then the Common Market to fervent supporters of it, and I've always thought that that was not an accident. The alleged parliament resembles the Supreme Soviet: highly privileged members, and no serious debates, no conception of an opposition.

I'm not saying it's like Stalin and the gulag, but I think the end result could well be quite like Brezhnev, and what some Russians still refer to as the golden time. There was plenty of vodka, plenty of sausage, national pride, but from the point of view of someone who wanted a free society, it was disastrous. The Brezhnev regime, though it wasn't Stalinist, was very nasty to those who persisted in dissenting. The European Union hasn't a gulag, but it also doesn't have *habeas corpus*, it doesn't have jury trial, or due process as it is understood in the U.S. and the U.K. It has no concept of opposition: Most of the press in the continental countries is complacent and sees itself to some extent as an arm of the government.

In Britain and other European countries, if you oppose the idea of the European Union, you are likely to be accused of xenophobia: the equivalent of "anti-Soviet activities."

TAE: Some E.U. defenders claim that the Catholic principle of subsidiarity is built into the Union, and that ceding powers to Brussels will actually promote decentralization.

HITCHENS: One of the main purposes of the European Union is to break down the nation-states into other units. The European Parliament will, if you press them, give you a map of these regions. England is divided into things called Northeast Region, Southeast Region, London Region, Eastern Region, which a lot of people don't even know they live in. There are shadow assemblies in these regions already being devised. The British Parliament at Westminster will continue to exist, but its powers, both internationally and nationally, will be sucked away: its international powers to Brussels, and its national powers will disappear to these artificial E.U. regions (along with the powers of our historic counties and city governments). This shift may be perfectly suited to

Illustration by Sam Torode

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Germany, because it was built on provinces, and today's Germans are afraid of being German. But if you happen to be a confident and successful nation, it means death.

TAE: On the relatively rare occasions when the rank and file in Europe have been allowed to vote on aspects of European unification, the answer has often been "no thanks." Yet the steamroller keeps rolling, and everyday Europeans just stand by like sheep.

HITCHENS: You've got to remember that representative democracy based on individual rights has never really been a homegrown plant on the European continent. The real question is why people in *Britain*, where self-rule has deep roots, have been so complacent. It's true that Britain never really developed a strong enough attachment to the idea that no man was entitled to rule anybody else without his permission. But this didn't matter so long as you had a conservative elite which was wedded to the principles of liberty. Now that that elite has died away, it matters immensely.

If Britain were the country it was 60 years ago, E.U. activists would be having a lot more difficulty than they are. I'm afraid the First and Second World Wars did a great deal of damage to our traditions of liberty, because they relied on centralization and state power and welfare. Imagine the effect on a country where what you eat, down to the last ounce of bread, is governed by state regulation for more than a decade. And imagine the effect on a country when its best and brightest people are exposed to the greatest dangers in two wars, so that twice in the space of 40 years large numbers of the most self-reliant people are killed. That could explain why we British are less protective of our liberties than we once were.

TAE: There is a story in your family in which a local squire once reminded your grandfather rather pompously that "I came over with the Normans." And your grandfather answered, "Yes, we were waiting for you." Where is that impulse now? Why aren't more Europeans screaming, "I don't need a Brussels bureaucrat to pat me on the head and direct my life"?

HITCHENS: Most people in Britain are reasonably prosperous, and they think freedom is like the air they breathe and the water they drink: It doesn't need defending. Most people under 35 don't know that things were ever different. If you say to them that *habeas corpus* is important, they'll say, "I'm not sure about that." A lot of people are all too willing to sacrifice their liberties. A number of times I've attacked the idea of identity cards and people have written me, "If you haven't done anything wrong, what have you got to fear?" Just wait until the first time you're stopped on the street by a policeman and you don't have your papers.

Representative democracy based on individual rights has never really been a homegrown plant on the European continent.

TAE: There are two separate and nearly opposite arguments against the E.U. today. One is that all of the red tape and bureaucracy is going to suffocate the continent. The second, contradictory, argument is that the E.U. is turning into a socialist superstate. Which is it? Are the Europeans becoming dangerously weak, or dangerously strong?

HITCHENS: The Soviet Union is evidence that you can be both. You can be a hopeless disaster internally and on the other hand an important threat externally.

The E.U. would like to expel American power from the European continent and weaken it everywhere else. If British military forces come under a European command, they won't any longer be used to support American operations. In that, and other, senses, the creation of the E.U. is an obstacle to American power.

TAE: Many Americans would love to talk the Europeans out of their adventure with centralism. But if this is what Europeans have decided they want to do, who are we to tell them otherwise?

HITCHENS: When British people like me ask the United States to resist further European integration, we're asking for assistance against Europe as we did in 1917 or 1940. We're expressing our own self-interest in trying to persuade you that it's in some way beneficial for you to intervene on our behalf. From a British point of view, further absorption into the European Union will be a disaster. And if America values the British alliance, then we do have a common interest.

This may well be a lost cause; reason tells me that it probably is. And the consequences will be awful—as the consequences of idealist projects almost always are.

TAE: There's no mechanism for a country to back out of the E.U.?

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HITCHENS: No. The obvious danger to point to is what happened to the United States when there was a determined conflict over centralization and states' rights. The United States had to take a plural verb before 1865; it took a singular one afterwards. U.S. history is evidence that forcing the pace of federation and destroying local independence can be a pretty quick way to serious conflict.

TAE: Is it conceivable that a pan-European government might lead to a backlash big enough to launch a genuine revival of liberty and decentralization?

HITCHENS: I find it far-fetched.

TAE: Is it possible that one of Britain's political parties might evolve into an anti-E.U. party?

HITCHENS: It doesn't seem very likely, because there is a general acceptance that European integration is beneficial. It would be very difficult to run an election campaign in which you said you were going to leave the E.U., as proponents of continued Union membership would insist that this would lead to serious job losses and economic privation. That's a risk that nobody wants to take.

And if you are a professional politician, the European Union offers many very nice career opportunities. Plus that wonderful luxury (which all politicians seek) of power without responsibility.

The parties in Britain are hollowed-out shells that hardly have any members. Meetings are barely attended. Political activism has practically ceased, and the generation which would have taken conservative views has faded.

Broadcasting is almost the only venue in this country where anything is debated, and even if there *were* a majority in favor of a conservative position it could be made to feel a minority by the fact that the broadcasters never give it air time. The outrageous partiality of broadcasting isolates opposition. If your opinion is never reflected in the only public place where you ever see issues debated, you begin to think that it's been discredited and defeated.

The outrageous partiality of broadcasting isolates opposition. If your opinion is never reflected where issues are debated, you begin to think that it's been discredited and defeated.

TAE: When Americans think of British television, they think of "quality" news and tony entertainment shows.

HITCHENS: I don't watch much television; I find that my eyes slide away from it and turn to books. But most British TV is on a level with the lower-grade schlock on American TV: semi-literate, full of foul language, soft porn.

But my objections go deeper than that. If it were all highly cultured, I still wouldn't like it. Television begins by plundering the culture. The best television generally plunders from books and plays and the arts that existed before. Once it has sucked all that dry, it has created a generation which only sees these things secondhand; it has to start plundering itself. It goes deeper and deeper into the cheapest forms of entertainment and the most superficial forms of documentary and news, because it has created people who don't have an attention span for anything better. It goes on and on until in the end it's MTV.

TAE: What is television's role in enforcing the "repressive conformism" which you say is sweeping England?

HITCHENS: Television is, like almost every cultural activity in this country, dominated by post-Christian liberal opinions. Almost all of the people who commission programs are elite liberals who despise conservative thought and morality. Even soap operas are used as a form of propaganda. Leading producers of these programs believe it is their moral duty to enlighten the world, particularly in sexual morality. You simply will not find conservative characters portrayed sympathetically in any of these soap operas. Take the popular radio soap *The Archers*, which is set in a rural area: The characters all talk like suburban liberals. They use metric measurements, which nobody uses. They even use Celsius temperatures, which nobody understands.

TAE: Is there popular resistance to the use of metric measurements?

HITCHENS: No. Once again, there is feeble resignation. In the city of Oxford, the butcher will still sell me meat by the pound—but he looks around when doing so.

TAE: You can buy porn magazines but it's illegal to sell steak by the pound?

HITCHENS: People don't care about it enough. The metric system and the imperial system symbolize beautifully the conflict between the European and the Anglo-Saxon method of thought. But for most people, metric is just an irritation which they overcome.

TAE: Is there any vitality in the Anglican church?

HITCHENS: No. The congregations are often

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elderly and dwindling, except in the evangelical congregations, which use modern liturgy and modern Bibles. They're quite successful. Good for them, but it doesn't look like the Christian religion that I was brought up with. It seems to me that there are some things which simply can't be expressed in twenty-first-century English, which need to be expressed in the timeless language of the King James Bible.

TAE: Should the Church be disestablished?

HITCHENS: At this point it would serve as an anti-Christian act. If you'd asked me the same question 200 years ago, I might have had a different answer. A lot of my forebears were very stern non-conformists who got into a lot of trouble for being non-Anglicans. They would have thought disestablishment was a good idea. But it's not an issue of liberty anymore. It's a question of whether we're a Christian country. I'd probably stand quite hard against disestablishment, which I think is coming.

TAE: To republican Americans, the monarchy is inexplicable. You argue that it can be a bulwark of liberty.

HITCHENS: The separation of headship of state from the headship of government is a very important part of maintaining liberty. Here, it's possible to be both loyal to the country and the head of state while being critical of the political government. In our system, which gives enormous (and growing) power to the executive, this is an essential protection. Parliament is actually now the creature of the executive, and seems to lack all independence. The existence of a monarch provides a rallying point for those who are against this.

What we saw with the celebration of the Queen's Jubilee this summer was a demonstration that part of the country isn't enamored with the current structure of government. I wouldn't want to see it go unless someone came up with something very good to replace it.

Americans overcome this problem in other ways, like the right of common citizens to bear arms. You guys were lucky in the drafters of your Constitution.

TAE: Should Americans be concerned about the development of a European defense force?

HITCHENS: This is designed to remove American control and influence over military decisions in Europe. They're not really trying to create a European force; they're trying to supplant what remains of the command structures of NATO, which of course provide for American supreme command.

The importance of a European defense force will probably not be major for the United States. Though it certainly is possible to imagine serious conflicts between the interests of a socialistic, centralized, not-very-free European superstate and the United States.

TAE: Why has anti-Americanism become more prominent in Europe just as we're becoming less present in the continent's affairs?

HITCHENS: You're not taking into account the disappearance of the Soviet threat. People aren't grateful to their protectors and saviors. Look at the French. They'll never forgive us for having helped to liberate them in 1944. It will be several hundred years before they get over it.

TAE: You had a very poignant section in your book about the strains that resulted within Britain when American GIs poured in amidst World War II, and how unpleasant it was to be occupied in order to be saved. With this in mind, if America were to pull back further from Europe and leave Europeans more to their own devices, wouldn't there be some good results from your point of view?

HITCHENS: Well, I'm not entirely sure what American troops are here for now, so troop withdrawals I could live with. I think NATO should have been wound up when the Soviet Union collapsed.

The withdrawal I fear would be the withdrawal of American influence from continental politics. If everything were left to float freely and there were no external influence at all, the power of Germany would become enormous.

TAE: But isn't it possible that the American backstop has enervated Europeans?

HITCHENS: I don't think the absence of America would suddenly stimulate a great stand-on-your-own-feet movement. On the contrary, it would just speed the process of sinking. You underestimate the desire of a lot of continental Europeans to slump into a centralized autocracy.

TAE: So a kind of imperial burden is being pressed upon America by many European conservatives. We're being told that if we don't stay in Europe the Europeans themselves won't have the sense to guard their own liberties.

HITCHENS: I live in a country which has a different history and different traditions and different interests than continental Europe. And I am angry that America has used so much of its diplomatic force to create a European Union and push Britain into it. Those who have done so will one day have cause to regret it.

TAE: Of course in the beginning, when America rather liked the idea of European integration, it was not a political—much less a socialist—project. It was a capitalist effort to open markets across borders and *reduce* state manipulations of economies.

HITCHENS: Capitalism and socialism are quite capable of coexisting. The only thing you have to sacrifice is liberty.

The Soviet Union taught intelligent socialists that you don't need state ownership to have state control of the economy. That's the great discovery on the basis of which left-wing governments now proceed. They seek to control the economy through taxation and regulation rather than through ownership. But the threat to economic and political liberty is exactly the same.

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THE EUROPEAN DISEASE

Irrational anti-Americanism takes root across the Atlantic

By Joshua Muravchik

is burned in
e's Olympic Stadium, 1999.

AP Photo/Pirilo Lepri

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised "unlimited solidarity" with the United States. A year later, he won a second term by pledging to German voters his unconditional refusal to cooperate with America's war against terrorism.

When the World Trade towers crumbled, France's *Le Monde* proclaimed in a banner headline, "We are all Americans." On the anniversary, the author of those words—French commentator Jean-Marie Colombani—offered a revision: "We have all become anti-Americans."

The moment at which Europe's solidarity with the United States evaporated came just four months after September 11, when the Pentagon released photos of al-Qaeda prisoners handcuffed and blindfolded as they arrived at a makeshift U.S. prison in Guantanamo. "Tortured," screamed the headline of the London *Mail*. America was slaking its "thirst for revenge," intoned Germany's *Der Spiegel*. Spain's *El Mundo* said Guantanamo reminded it "of the torture centers in Eastern Europe during the Cold War." And former Anglican envoy Terry Waite, invoking his five years of mistreatment at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists in Lebanon, declaimed: "I can recognize the conditions that prisoners are being kept in at Guantanamo Bay because I have been there."

London *Evening Standard* columnist A. N. Wilson argued that, "These stories and pictures horrify us, but they should not surprise us." After all, "the Bush administration…are the most merciless exponents of world capitalism, with the determination to have a McDonald's and a Starbucks…in every country on earth." (And how better to spread restaurant franchises than by torturing Arabs in Cuba?) The Guantanamo photos, in short, inspired Europe to revert to the hostility toward America that had prevailed for a decade. The outpouring of empathy inspired by the collapse of New York's Twin Towers had only *seemed* to change all that.

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It quickly turned out that the prisoners in the photograph were only shackled and blindfolded because they were being transported. When delegations from the Red Cross and the French and British governments visited Guantanamo, they discovered that the detainees "had absolutely no complaints about mistreatment at all." Yet even after learning that the tales of mistreatment were false, the European parliament adopted a resolution gratuitously calling on the U.S. "to guarantee humane treatment for all detainees...and respect for international humanitarian law and human rights norms and principles." Moreover, the oft-repeated complaint that the U.S. was flouting the Geneva convention ignored both the letter and the spirit of that treaty. It allowed many different kinds of fighters to be considered POWs, including guerrillas, provided that they carry arms openly and "conduct...their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." No Archimedean lever could shoehorn al-Qaeda into this definition since the group's very *raison d'être* was to erase the most fundamental law of war, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.

Giving the Guantanamo detainees POW status to which they were not entitled would have barred the U.S. from asking them anything other than their names, ranks, and serial numbers, thereby denying America a vital trove of information about future terror plans and operations. (This, while many Europeans were trying to dissuade the U.S. from military action on the grounds that "intelligence" offered better hope of defeating the terrorists.)

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, the American ambassador to the European Union had suggested that "this will drive the U.S. and the E.U. together.... Our common values will take precedence over...the lesser issues on which we have been concentrating in the last couple of years." But this turned out to be an American pipe dream. Once the Taliban was overthrown and al-Qaeda rousted from the caves of Tora Bora, America had gotten its pound of flesh, so far as Europe was concerned. Any measures beyond this would show that it was not the terrorists but *America* that constituted the real "threat to world peace," as South Africa's Nelson Mandela put it.

President Bush had been reviled in Europe from the moment he took office. He was a "serial killer," in the words of French education minister Jack Lang (a reference to executions in Texas while Bush was governor). Italy's *La Repubblica* sniffed that "Texas's 'eternal youngster'" needed to learn "that the world is not his family ranch, full of mustangs to tame with America's lasso."

But if Bush epitomized many of the American traits that European elites hate, he was not the source of the transatlantic split. The 1990s were marked by recurrent expressions of European enmity from the trashing of McDonald's to false accusations of industrial espionage by the CIA to Europe's impassioned campaign against capital punishment in America (Italian cities each "adopted" a death row inmate in Texas). When a gun discharged in a French high school in 1998, ending the life of one of the boys who was playing with it, the French minister of education rushed to the press to denounce the real culprit: America, which he said had contaminated France with its "civilization of violence" spread through movies. When French investigative journalists unearthed evidence of their government's complicity with the genocidal regime in Rwanda, French state officials hinted that the CIA had planted these stories as part of an American plot to supplant French influence in Africa. (Everyone knows how much Americans have lusted for a deeper role in Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Burundi.)

Many of the European complaints seemed disingenuous. During debates over enlargement of NATO by including newly free Iron Curtain countries, our European allies wanted the U.S. to pledge never to use force without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. This contradicted the U.N. Charter itself, which reserves to each state an "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." Indeed, no sooner had the Europeans made their clamor over this issue than they joined in war against the Serbs over Kosovo, a war that enjoyed neither the blessing of the Security Council nor any basis in international law.

Fully two thirds of European elites say it is "good for the U.S. to be vulnerable."

The real motive behind the misplaced demand for Security Council approval, explained London's *Daily Telegraph*, was "fears in European governments [of] Alliance members tagging along behind American-led foreign-policy initiatives." In other words, the same allies who today are making a fuss about the possibility that America would act "unilaterally" without them, were complaining just a few years ago about the prospect that America would act with them. Likewise, current complaints about American globalism were preceded in the early Bush months by hand-wringing over American "isolationism." In short, the recent message to America from her European allies has been: damned if you do, and damned if you don't.

It is similarly hard to take seriously European indignation over the death penalty. Most European governments themselves only abolished the practice in the 1970s, '80s, and '90s, and public opinion surveys show that most of their citizens (if not the elites) continue to favor capital punishment. In any case, it is impossible to understand how executions in the United States rank as an important international human rights concern in a world rife with torture, concentration camps, extra-judicial

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executions, slavery, the treatment of women as property, and many other depredations of tyranny.

Perhaps the European obsession with American executions was prompted by a categorical sense of the sanctity of human life. But if so, how to explain Holland's legalization of euthanasia or the permissive abortion laws in several E.U. states? Then consider France and Britain's *realpolitik* tilt in favor of the Serbs while they murdered hundreds of thousands of Bosnians; Belgium's acquiescence and France's ambiguous role in the genocide in Rwanda; or Paris's diplomatic support for Iraq despite Saddam Hussein's well-documented use of chemical weapons to kill thousands of Iraqi Kurds. What kind of moral sensitivity is pierced by the execution of violent convicts (the death of Timothy McVeigh was "sad, pathetic, and wrong," pronounced the Council of Europe) but little moved by the slaughter of innocents? If it is capital punishment itself that is somehow unbearable to contemplate, why Europe's refusal to sponsor resolutions critical of China in the U.N. Human Rights Commission? China executes as many prisoners every week as America does in a year.

Something other than humanitarian conviction was driving the European campaign against capital punishment in the U.S. The issue had become, said Italian president Carlo Ciampi in 2000, "a most eloquent signal affirming a European identity." It was, as Jean-Claude Casanova put it in *Le Monde*, a touchstone of Europe's sense of "supériorité morale."

Ironically, September 11 gave Europeans a more genuine way to demonstrate their moral qualities by rising above petty jealousies to lock arms with America against a common threat. After the first few hopeful signs, however, many Europeans failed this test. In France, *September 11: The Horrifying Fraud*, a book alleging that the attacks were not carried about by foreigners but by right-wingers within the U.S. government, became, as the *Times* of London reported, "an overnight sensation, rocketing to the top of the charts and breaking the national record for first-month sales held by Madonna's *Sex*."

Nor was the mood much kinder to the U.S. even in England, whose Prime Minister made himself America's staunchest ally. The novelist Salman Rushdie, a man of the Left rarely accused of pro-American bias, was moved to write: "Night after night, I have found myself listening to Londoners' diatribes against the sheer weirdness of the American citizenry. The [9/11] attacks on America are routinely discounted. ('Americans care only about their own dead.') American patriotism, obesity, emotionality, self-centeredness: These are the crucial issues."

While many Europeans felt genuine sympathy for America for the wound it had suffered, most, according to a poll commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, believed that it was caused in part by U.S. foreign policy. Fully two thirds of the sample of European elites questioned by the Pew Research Center said their countrymen feel it is "good for the U.S. to be vulnerable."

What about today's opposition to America's anticipated war with Iraq? That in itself is not tantamount to anti-Americanism. Yet there is something fishy about Europe's stance. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer insists that instead of using force, the "sanctions regime" against Iraq should be "further developed." Yet for years, European leaders have been pushing for easing or eliminating those very sanctions. Likewise, Gerhard Schröder first said he would not support the use of military power without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. Then, as the U.S. drew close to securing such authorization, Schröder pushed back the goal posts and said he would not support military action even *with* U.N. support. In short, Europe's proposals for dealing with Iraq seemed designed less to force change in Baghdad than to foment paralysis in Washington.

Europe's slipperiness on Middle East policy can also be seen in the case of Iran. A number of Europeans have argued that Iraq is the wrong target because it is relatively low on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This might have been a strong argument had it been followed to its logical conclusion, namely, to focus the anti-terror campaign on the likes of Syria, Lebanon, and above all Iran. The Tehran regime—whose proclaimed "basic motto" is "death to America"—has done much over two decades to spread a way of thinking throughout the Muslim world of which September 11 was a logical culmination. There is, moreover, no denying Tehran's own terrorist activities in many venues including Europe. Iranian agents are suspected in murderous attacks in France, Germany, Italy, England, Norway, Turkey, and Switzerland, as well as the United States. Yet Europe's current prescription for Iran is to remove sanctions entirely.

This June, just as mounting street demonstrations and government repression made it clear that much of the Iranian public has lost patience with the Islamic Republic, the E.U. announced a new drive to expand commerce with the Tehran regime. Trade with Iran "has enormous potential in view of the country's rich endowments of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals, as well as agricultural wealth and industrial potential," burbled the European Commission. While a new E.U.-Iranian trade agreement eventually stalled over political conditions, Germany pushed ahead in August with its own investment pact with Tehran. "Even at a time when there are some doubts in the region, E.U. countries like Germany stick to their policy of boosting bilateral ties," crowed German economics minister Werner Müller. No scruples about terrorism were mentioned. Remind me again, is it America or Europe that represents amoral capitalism?

Apart from its contradictory proposals for dealing with Iran and Iraq, Europe's other strategy for the war against terrorism is to "eradicate the breeding ground for potential terrorism," as European Commission ambassador Günter Burghardt put it. This "breeding ground" is defined neither as the hate-spewing theocracy of Iran nor the network of mosques and *madrassas* where radical Islam is propagated, but rather *poverty*, which is

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said to incite Middle Easterners to become terrorists by the thousands. Quite apart from the fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were men of comfortable means, the E.U. has already demonstrated the futility of this sort of thinking through its funnelling of 3.5 billion euros to the Palestinian Authority since 1994. That makes "Palestine" the world's leading per capita recipient of foreign aid, yet far from abating, Palestinian terror had crescendoed amidst this largesse.

Europe's approach to "battling" terrorism is so hollow and self-contradictory as to suggest that its real goal is to tie the hands of the United States. Europeans seem to feel more threatened by their superpower ally than by bombmakers. The *New York Times* recently quoted a Parisian scholar specializing in the U.S. who complained that "America has no more enemy. It does what it likes now when it wants. Through NATO it directs European affairs. Before we could say we were on America's side. Now there is no counterbalance."

In a like vein, *Der Spiegel* lamented (back during the Clinton years) that "Americans are acting, in the absence of limits put on them by anybody or anything, as if they own a blank check in their 'McWorld.'" Dominique Moisi, the head of France's leading institute of international affairs, commented recently that European hostility is aimed not at what America does, but at "what America is." But what is America that is so offensive—except a superpower that casts Europe's weakness into high relief?

The German Marshall Fund/Chicago CFR survey asked Europeans whether they would like the E.U. to become a superpower like the United States; 65 percent said yes and 14 percent said no. (Among the French, a whopping 91 percent said yes and only 3 percent no.) But only about half of those who said "yes" were willing to increase defense spending to make it happen. Remarkably, nine out of ten said their goal was to be an equal partner with the U.S., not a competitor. In other words, they are not afraid of America; rather they are wounded in their pride by the vast disparity between their successes and ours.

The quest to salvage pride also underlies Europe's adoption of a common currency. The goal, said former French prime minister Lionel Jospin, was to "enable Europe to regain its sovereignty…to rebalance the big power blocs." Likewise, Germany's former chancellor Helmut Schmidt predicted with satisfaction that the euro "will change the whole world situation so that the United States can no longer call all the shots." For French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, the euro was just a first step. "The entire foreign policy of France," he declared, "is aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed of several poles, not just a single one." That makes America foreign policy enemy number one.

Is America a selfish rogue state, as some Europeans have claimed? The U.S. war on terrorism is of course motivated by self-defense, but also by a broad concern for world order. Our determination to take down Saddam Hussein, for which we have been so much criticized on the other side of the Atlantic, is especially public spirited. If Washington were truly selfish, it could strike an easy deal with Saddam: Do what you want in your region, just don't mess with us. That is a deal Saddam would surely take. And he would be happy to sell us oil to fund his local tyranny. But it is a deal America will never offer.

The countries for whom the sole polestar is self-interest are the French and the Russians, whose resistance to war against Iraq flows from their own commercial and diplomatic interests, global security be damned. The same pattern of unprincipled selfishness, and sycophancy toward the world's oil-rich Muslim states, led six out of nine E.U. members on the U.N. Human Rights Commission to vote for a resolution this spring that endorsed suicide bombings as a legitimate form of struggle.

It is also selfishness that lies at the root of Europe's weakness. Collectively, the E.U. states are as wealthy and more populous than the United States. They are potentially more powerful—if they are willing to pay the price of subsuming national egos, trimming welfare states, and bearing risks and burdens far from home. But rather than strive for the best in themselves, many Europeans prefer to wallow in resentment. Meanwhile, America goes about the dirty business of making the world safer—for itself, and for them.

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A GERMAN-AMERICAN REQUIEM

By Karina Rollins

AP Photo/Markus Schreiber

"Peace for the World, Pretzels for Bush" (referring to the incident where President Bush choked into unconsciousness). So reads a banner on a Berlin tower in May 2002.

There was nothing like the great German-American romance. Just ask all those American soldiers who came to Germany as victors over the greatest evil in history, and stayed to become the German people's most devoted friends. (Not to mention husbands to countless German girls.)

Pictures of hordes of children crowded around GIs handing out candy are among Germany's most famous post-war images. Everything that was American was exciting, new, and cool. It was an American President who told Berliners that he was one of them. By 1963 the Cold War was at a deep freeze and U.S. troop levels in Germany were at 254,000. American military families had crossed the Atlantic en masse, bringing American schools and shopping centers with them. By the mid 1960s it was hard to go anywhere in middle or southern Germany without running into an "Ami"—the sometimes derogatory, mostly affectionate, term Germans use to refer to Americans.

By the time I—the result of one of those countless German-Ami unions—went from kindergarten through fifth grade at one of those American schools in the '70s, a Germany without Americans was unimaginable. U.S. installations were everywhere; autobahns sported signs for U.S. Army posts, air bases, commissaries, and gas stations. During military training exercises, German roads hosted convoys of camouflaged U.S. trucks and tanks, and Germans and Amis waved at each other. When I went out for dinner at German restaurants with my parents, my father was rarely the only American in the place. On most any road you would see the green license plates (later changed to white) with the "USA" stickers go sailing by.

I celebrated the Fourth of July on U.S. Army posts, which opened to the public and attracted hordes of German revelers. German carnivals and fairs drew crowds of Americans, and there was always happy intermingling. Krauts and Amis co-hosted German-American Friendship Day celebrations, where Germans ordered hamburgers and Americans ate bratwurst, and the lapel pins with the U.S. and German flags were the most common sight.

The idea that this might ever change never occurred to me.

When I was in college in the U.S., the Berlin Wall fell, the Evil Empire crumbled, and within a few years, the number of American troops in Germany plummeted to fewer than 50,000 (currently back up to 70,000). One American installation after another was closed down and handed back to the Germans. The world had become safer, but also a bit sadder. Today, an American license plate on the autobahn is the exception. At German celebrations, there are often only Germans. The Germans had incorporated so much of Ami life into their own that concern about losing their favorite radio station—AFN (the U.S. Armed Forces Network)—became a mass worry.

Despite the massive troop withdrawal, the love affair continued. It was evident in Germany's stirring 9/11 response: Church bells rang simultaneously across the country; "We are all New Yorkers," proclaimed chancellor Gerhard Schröder; teenagers

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painted "We are all Americans" on their T-shirts. Grown-ups wore black armbands.

To me, such solidarity was not a surprise. After all, I was raised in a world where Germany and the U.S. were the very closest of allies. It was a jab in my heart when President Bush proclaimed before a Joint Session of Congress nine days after the terror attacks that "America has no truer friend than Great Britain." To my dismay, I soon realized he was right.

The quickly mounting criticisms that followed the initial outpourings of sympathy from allies like France or Saudi Arabia were disappointing, but not entirely unexpected. The German collapse of moral clarity and steadfastness shocked me. Unwavering German opposition to any U.S. military action against Iraq even became the main theme of the national elections in September. At a campaign rally a week before the election, Chancellor Schröder explained his position with these meaningless words: "What we need in the Middle East is more peace, not more war!" Apparently he didn't need a more thoughtful argument, because the German people, including even his hard-hitting conservative opponent, Bavarian governor Edmund Stoiber, seemed in complete agreement.

Having returned to Germany every year since I moved to the U.S. in 1989, I embarked on my most recent trip in September with some trepidation. Americans often describe the "condemn Bush first, Saddam second" attitude of many Europeans as simple anti-Americanism. But there are differences by country.

While the French have deemed the use of American words a cultural crime, the Germans continue to absorb American English at a furious pace, substituting our words for German ones sometimes just for the heck of it. I was stunned to see, perusing the dessert list at a well-known delicatessen chain, "Hot Berries" (instead of Heiße Himbeeren) and "Apple Cake" (instead of Apfelkuchen). German tourists continue to flock to the U.S. Things American remain cool. German towns now feature restaurants with names like The American Corner—complete with a Stars & Stripes in the window and Budweiser on the menu. It seems the Germans are trying to make up for the loss of the omnipresent Ami by creating Americanisms throughout Germany.

Everyday Germans still like Americans, and the 9/11 sorrow was genuine. One woman I spoke to at a wine fest two days before the election told me that "September 11, 2001 was the worst day of my life." She recognizes the threat of al-Qaeda as well as that of Saddam Hussein. Yet, still, she maintains that George W. Bush is "too radical" in his approach to rooting out terror. Few Germans deny the depth of the terror threat, when pushed. Yet they invariably begin conversations on the topic by pointing out how the cowboy in the White House scares them. (No mention whatever of the Butcher of Baghdad.) Why hasn't German emotional solidarity carried over into practical support?

Many Germans express concern about hundreds of thousands of civilian Iraqi deaths in the event of a war. Many cite the need for multilateral action in a modern world. And person after person, including some of my friends, told me that while terrorists are indeed bad people, Germans don't like that the U.S. "sees everything in black and white." I was admonished to recognize the root causes of the deadly hatred for Americans sweeping the Islamic world. Those causes? Always American policies and American actions. "Aggression begets counter-aggression" one of my friends explained to me.

It seems a combination of near-sighted humanitarian concern and simple moral relativism is what contributes most heavily to the Germans' schizophrenic attitude toward their old Ami friends. Many Americans hold exactly the same views, of course, but here such thinking is contained on the Left. In Germany, as in the rest of Europe, moral relativism—the refusal to make decisive judgments about right and wrong—has seeped into the entire national character. The result: Whatever affections Germans may harbor in their hearts, the rhetoric and actions that flow from Germany today might just as well come from our enemies. For someone like me who is as much German as American, this is profoundly depressing.

True, there were always Germans (and Americans) who defended the Soviet Union and demonized the U.S. But while millions of German peaceniks were screaming in the streets in the '80s, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt insisted on deployment of America's Pershing II missiles. Today, Chancellor Schröder says he'll refuse any assistance to the U.S. in a war against a terror regime even *with* a U.N. blessing. Today, one of those screaming peaceniks is Germany's foreign minister and most popular politician. Today, Germany's justice minister can compare George Bush to Adolf Hitler without causing a national uproar among a people who should recognize the atrocity of the analogy better than anyone. Today, the host of a German TV show begins his introduction on the Tom Cruise movie *Minority Report* by stating matter-of-factly: "Out of fear of terrorism, civil rights are violated in the U.S."

I have to conclude that the future looks bleak for the great German-American love affair. Even if German mouths continue to profess love for the U.S., American shoulders are quickly growing cold.

But as a hopeless romantic, I have to believe that the sparks can be rekindled. I can't stop thinking about my visit to Germany around Christmas time two years ago. A friend and I went to one of those Christmas markets found in every German town. Booths selling festive food and drink, holiday gifts, and decorations lined the streets. We stood in the cobble-stoned town square, surrounded by half-timbered houses, centuries old, their roofs covered with snow. A brass ensemble played beloved German Christmas songs. Among them was "I'm Dreaming of a White Christmas."

If you'd been there, you'd understand.

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FRIENDS? FOES? DISCONNECTED STRANGERS?

Europe and America over the next generation

A symposium featuring

Jeffrey Gedmin, Andrew Sullivan, Jonathan Rauch, Mark Steyn, Michael Kelly, Jonah Goldberg, and John O'Sullivan

A ONE-SIDED ALLIANCE

By Jeffrey Gedmin

God help you if you're loved by the Germans. It started at the moment Chancellor Gerhard Schröder pledged his country's "uneingeschränkte Solidarität" (unrestricted solidarity) with the United States in the war against terrorism.

Around that same time, Ulrich Wickert, a prominent German television anchor, mused that George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden really share the "same patterns of thinking." Composer Karl-Heinz Stockhausen contended that the attack on the World Trade Center was a work of art. The German fashion designer Joop blamed America for the atrocities. It was our fault, apparently, that Arabs felt humiliated. German solidarity seemed to know no bounds.

Today Mr. Schröder steadfastly rejects involvement in an American "adventure" in Iraq. A leading parliamentarian has likened the U.S. President to a Roman emperor; the justice minister thought Adolf H. was the more appropriate comparison. Indeed it's commonplace for politicians and commentators to cite three reasons why the U.S. wants to remove Saddam Hussein from power: 1) America wants oil; 2) America wants to dominate the region; and 3) America wants to bully its European allies.

It has become a strange debate. After fighting for years to have sanctions against Iraq lifted—they only hurt common people, we were told—Europe now extols the virtues of those economic sticks. After participating enthusiastically in a military intervention in Kosovo without a U.N. mandate, Europe now argues that only the United Nations can offer American self-defense a proper legal and moral basis.

Clearly, we have a problem. The Germans may be especially prickly, but all of Europe is following a similar pattern of conflict with the U.S. The issues have varied: Kyoto, the International Criminal Court (ICC), a treaty to ban land mines, criticism of the death penalty in the U.S., the European Union's "Critical Dialogue" with the mullahs in Tehran. For at least a decade now, European elites have been trying to tell us that they want a new world order; that their vision is not ours. They are desperate to re-negotiate the transatlantic relationship. They want more power and independence.

Fair enough. But America should take European advice on foreign policy with a grain of salt. Remember that leading Euro-

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peans argued initially against the liberation of Kuwait, against the enlargement of NATO, against scrapping the old ABM Treaty, against the use of force on Slobodan Milosevic, against missile defense, against military action in Afghanistan.

All the while, Atlanticists have tried to keep faith in Euro-American unity (I was one of them). Some explained it was just Bill Clinton's weak leadership. Others opined that when center-right governments returned to power in Europe there would be a more cooperative spirit.

Actually, Tony Blair has done fine in the U.K. When the Tories finally return they may indeed steer Britain even closer to America, but they will never steer the rest of Europe anywhere. It's laughable, of course, to think that a different political constellation in France would significantly change U.S.-French relations—even if Gerhard Schröder is doing everything he can to improve those ties. Conservatives in Spain and Italy have helped, perhaps, on the margins. But Edmund Stoiber, Chancellor Schröder's conservative challenger in Germany's recent elections, is the kind of "pro-American" who rejects the U.S. economic model at home, wants to impose the Kyoto Treaty and the ICC on the whole world, and thinks the U.S. has too much power in the world. "Niemals"—absolutely never—said Mr. Stoiber during the campaign, when asked whether he would permit the U.S. to use its bases in Germany to attack Saddam Hussein if the Americans moved unilaterally.

Since the Cold War ended, the transatlantic alliance has been kept alive by the hope that even if the flesh was weak, the spirit was still willing. Western Europe has bad demographics (aging populations and declining birth rates); a heavy commitment to high social spending and weak economic growth; and dwindling defense expenditures. When Germany sent modest forces to Afghanistan, it had to borrow aircraft from the Ukraine to get them to the field. Recently, Berlin's defense minister protested American war plans by threatening to remove Germany's half dozen biological and chemical weapons-detecting vehicles from Kuwait. He had better keep the Pentagon's number handy, because without help from the Americans (or someone else) the Germans do not have the airlift to get their equipment out.

Of course, we're likely to get through Iraq with the Europeans. More than anything they are afraid of being left out. But beyond that? Once upon a time, it was hoped that the inclusion of the central Europeans would re-invigorate the transatlantic alliance with a fresh dose of idealism and pro-American sentiment. As NATO heads to its next summit in Prague, prepared to enlarge again, it could yet happen. But time is running out. How long can an alliance really function when key allies believe that building themselves up means cutting America down?

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AMERICA WON'T LISTEN TO EUROPE'S APPEASERS

By Andrew Sullivan

In London and Paris, Berlin and Brussels, the papers are full of war speculation: demands that parliament be recalled, rumors of cabinet resignations, and polls showing George W. Bush's unpopularity. But in the imperial capital, thousands of miles away, a strange calm prevails. Despite the efforts of anti-war newspapers such as the *New York Times*, polls consistently show that up to 70 percent of Americans support war against Iraq. Americans are not blithe about it: Their sons and daughters will die. But neither will they ignore a threat to the West as dangerous as any we have faced.

The American response to European resistance is best summed up by a slightly impatient sigh. If Europeans opposed even the war in Afghanistan, what chance is there they will support war against Iraq? Americans have seen it before. They'll see it again. Meanwhile, they have work to do.

But at a deeper and more worrying level, it's increasingly true that many Americans simply don't care any more what Europe thinks. And why on earth should they? Militarily, Europe is a dud and well on the way to becoming a complete irrelevance. Europeans couldn't even prevent genocide in their own continent in the 1990s. Britain apart, Europeans have contributed a minuscule amount of the resources to de-fang al-Qaeda. Despite September 11, they continue to cut defense spending so savagely that, except for the U.K., they are virtually useless as military allies.

If someone who won't lock his door at night starts complaining about the only cop on the beat, sane people should wonder what has happened to his grip on reality. Similarly, it is one thing for Europeans to say they are ceding military responsibility to America to maintain international order. It is quite another for Europeans then to object when America takes them at their word. And the need for such order has not gone away in the last decade. It was once impossible to conceive that terrorists could destroy New York, or Rome. But they are on the verge of that capability, and last September proved that they would not hesitate to use it.

The average American therefore feels like asking Europeans: Just what about September 11 do you not understand? These fanatics want to kill you and destroy your civilization.

The prudential equation when it comes to dealing with Saddam is that he is a tyrant doing all he can to get biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, has invaded a neighboring state, used chemical weapons on his own people, subsidizes terror elsewhere in the Middle East, and has ties to Islamic terrorist groups around the world. Doesn't the benefit of the doubt shift toward those who would dethrone him? And doesn't the mass grave of 3,000 people in New York tilt the equation a little?

When religious leaders argue that the U.S. is more morally

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troubling than a butcher like Saddam, you know the forces of appeasement are as powerful today as in the 1970s and the 1930s. Were it not for America, al-Qaeda, with support from Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Hamas, would still be ensconced in Afghanistan planning more attacks on the West. Yet the European response to the mission has been increased criticism.

Victor Davis Hanson sums up a common American view of European complainers: "The Middle East? Shame on you, not us, for financing the terrorists on the West Bank.... Racism? Arabs are safer in America than Jews are in Europe. That 200,000 people were butchered in Bosnia and Kosovo a few hours from Rome and Berlin is a stain on you, the inactive, not us, the interventionist. Capital punishment? Our government has executed terrorists; yours have freed them. Do the moral calculus."

There are, of course, deeper reasons for Europe's aversion to American power. By unilaterally disarming itself, Europe makes a statement about how the world should be governed: by diplomacy, international agreements, pooled sovereignty. But the only reason the European Union can exist is because American military force defeated the Nazis. All of Germany is part of the E.U. only because American military might defeated the Soviet Union. Europhiles don't realize that the only guarantor of European peace is American force. Europeans should pray for it in order to save their own political achievement.

Europeans may believe that national interest is a thing of the past and military power an anachronism. Within the confines of a few European countries, they may be right. But in the wider world, especially the Middle East, history hasn't ended and a new threat to world peace is rising. If Europeans believe it can be palliated by diplomacy or appeasement, they are misreading their own times as profoundly as they did in the 1930s.

The question for European leaders is whether they want to be adult players in a new and dangerous world. Grow up and join in—or pipe down and let us do it. That's the message America is sending. It's a message long, long overdue.

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THE REAL PROBLEM IS EUROPEAN ELITES

By Jonathan Rauch

In September, when dismay over a growing rift between America and Europe was rife, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations announced the results of an ambitious transatlantic survey. People in America and six European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland) were asked about Iraq, foreign policy, and each other.

Predictably, a firm majority of Europeans—60 percent—said the United States should invade Iraq only with the approval of the United Nations and the support of allies. Less expectedly, 65 percent of Americans said exactly the same thing. Half the Europeans named global warming as a major threat to their vital interests—as did 46 percent of Americans. About three fourths of Europeans *and* Americans expressed strong support for the U.N., and pluralities or majorities on both sides believed that the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and NATO should be strengthened.

People on both continents liked and disliked the same countries, with the important exception of Israel, and they also liked each other. Europeans gave America a favorable rating of 64 percent, which was only 6 points below the rating they gave the European Union. Nearly 80 percent of Americans wanted strong E.U. leadership in world affairs, and more than 60 percent of Europeans wanted strong American leadership in world affairs.

Spot the crisis?

In some areas, of course, Americans and Europeans disagreed vigorously. But the overall message was clear: The American and European *publics* are much closer in outlook than are their *leaders*. With an important exception (which I'll come to), U.S.-European relations are sounder than they look.

The cultural divide is real, but it is not new. Americans have always tended to regard Europe as sophisticated but unprincipled, and Europeans have long seen America as vigorous but naïve and self-righteous. While the gap narrowed in the second half of the last century, that was mostly due to the common Soviet threat and Europe's postwar dependence on America. Today's culture gap is a return to normalcy.

The U.S.-Europe asymmetry in military power is awkward, but it is a manageable problem. So is the political asymmetry that puts America reliably to the right of Europe. Disagreements over values (capital punishment, genetic engineering) and priorities (global warming, Iraq) are troublesome, but at bottom alliances are built on common interests, and America's and Europe's broad interests—in democracy, in trade, in defending core freedoms—coincide more closely now than ever.

Two centuries ago America was at war with Britain. One century ago it was at war with Spain. Just 60 years ago it was at war with Germany and Italy. Then, for a while, Europe seemed headed for socialism—soft or possibly hard. Today America may be more tough and Europe more tender, but from al-Qaeda's point of view the U.S. and the E.U. are Tweedledum and Tweedledee, their disagreements rancorous but comically minor.

There is one serious concern: Through the European Union, the International Criminal Court, and other multilateral structures and agreements, Europe is vesting ever more authority in bureaucratic internationalism. Multinational entities such

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as the World Trade Organization, NATO, and the U.N. have existed for a long time, but Europe is increasingly vesting core government prerogatives—the power to prosecute and judge, the power to regulate and make law, and soon perhaps the power to tax and make war—in bodies that are accountable to governments, not voters.

To some extent this is a well-intentioned effort to reduce economic and political friction. But to a considerable extent it is also, I believe, a deliberate attempt by Europe's political elites to usurp power from the sort of people who eat at McDonald's, wave national flags, and drive cars for fun: that is, from mainstream European voters.

One result is the entrenchment of a European political class that is well to the left of Europe's electorate. The risk is that bureaucratic internationalism will give Europe a continent-wide case of Japanitis, its rulers out of touch and unpopular, its policies out of kilter yet impervious to reform.

The deeper problem is that bureaucratic internationalism is fundamentally inconsistent with democratic values. Yes, American democracy features undemocratic elements (the federal courts, the Federal Reserve), and they are very powerful; but they are also exceptional and surrounded on all sides by elected officials. The plan of Europeans talking of "ever closer union" is to take governance ever further from voters. On principled as well as pragmatic grounds, this is a tendency that America will increasingly be called upon to resist, even at the cost of transatlantic rows like the one over the International Criminal Court.

Europeans are wrong to see bureaucratic internationalism as a stabilizing influence. In the long run, the unmooring of public decision making from popular sovereignty is a recipe for capricious policies and unstable politics. You would think that Europeans, of all people, might appreciate this.

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GOODBYE EUROPE

By Mark Steyn

I find it easier to be optimistic about the futures of Iraq and Pakistan than, say, Holland or Denmark. What's wrong with the Islamic world is relatively straightforward. With Europe, it's harder to foresee any happy endings. The good news is we won't have to worry about another Hitler or Mussolini because, on present reproductive trends, the Italians and Germans are going to be out of business in a couple of generations. Few people have ever been in less need of *lebensraum*. Instead, the European Union figures it will require another 50 million immigrants in the next few years just to maintain a big enough working population to fund the lavish social programs its vast retired army of baby boomers expects to enjoy.

The main source of European immigration is Muslim youth from North Africa and the Middle East. Whether these are the chaps to keep Hans and Pierre in the style to which they've become accustomed is a moot point: According to some Scandinavian statistics, 40 percent of those on welfare are immigrants. And, while it's not true that every immigrant on welfare is an Islamic terrorist, it's a good rule of thumb that every Islamic terrorist in Europe has been on welfare, living in radicalized ghetto cultures with nothing to do but sit around the flat plotting the *jihad* all day. Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammed, who recently held a pro-Osama rally in London, has demanded the imposition of Islamic law in Britain, and at one time called for the assassination of then-Prime Minister John Major. Given that it's Mr. Major's ministry, and now Tony Blair's, that has financially supported Sheikh Omar ever since he arrived 15 years ago, that seems a tad ungrateful.

In defiance of traditional immigration patterns, Europe's young Muslims are less assimilated than their parents and grandparents. Instead of becoming more European, they're becoming more Islamist. If the "root cause" of September 11 is Islam's difficulty with modernity, we shouldn't be surprised that this manifests itself less in Indonesia than in Holland, the epitome of the boundlessly tolerant post-nationalist state, a liberal utopia of cannabis cafés and gay marriage—for now. Sheikh Omar's demand for the imposition of *sharia* doesn't seem so absurd when you consider that in 20 years the majority of the Dutch under 18 will be Muslim.

A multiculturalist society has a hard time even discussing these things. In the advanced technocratic Euro-state, almost any issue worth talking about has been ruled taboo. Continental voters, faced with a choice between Eurodee and Eurodum, have been turning elsewhere. The beneficiaries of this tune-out, in Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and elsewhere, don't have much in common—some are maverick magnates, some fascist nostalgists, others gay hedonists. What unites them is what they're against: the traditional European cultural consensus that's now sleepwalking its way to suicide.

In Holland, a militant vegan killed the flamboyant homosexual nativist Pim Fortuyn during the election campaign. Surely the first time in Dutch political history that a fruitarian had killed a fruit Aryan. This murder is an apt summation of what Marx would call the "internal contradictions" of the rainbow coalition.

Popular politicians who survive their campaigns shouldn't expect a congratulatory telegram from the grandees at the European Union. In February, the Belgian foreign minister, speaking on behalf of the E.U., threatened sanctions against Italy if its citizens voted for Umberto Bossi's Northern League. Those Continentals who attacked President Bush for presuming "to tell people who they can vote for" when he gave an anti-Yasser Arafat speech forget that in Europe they do it all the time.

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Before it too offended the E.U., the perfect emblem of the post-war European state was Austria, where regardless of how you voted you wound up with the same center-left-right coalition government. That was the whole point. Europe's post-war political structures were specifically designed to stifle the populace's baser urges. Indeed, Europe has been so focused on what went wrong in the past it's been blind to what might go wrong in the future. The future is now here. A collapsed birthrate, accelerating immigration, lavish welfare, an evasive political culture, phony transnational structures: For Europe, this is the Perfect Storm.

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AN ANTIDOTE TO EUROPE

By Michael Kelly

European public opinion—as represented in the European press—is mostly limited to elite opinion. And for decades, much of this elite class has cherished a sneering and jingoistic contempt for America and for American values. This attitude fulfills an obvious psychological need: As the former global ruling class of Europe saw America emerge overwhelmingly dominant in economic, political, military, and cultural terms, a natural response was to insist on Europe's moral and intellectual superiority.

Sometimes this leads to hypocritical posturing. Nowhere is this more risibly obvious than in the outrage expressed by European politicians over Bush's position on the Kyoto protocol on global warming. Bush did not kill Kyoto. He buried its moldering corpse. Kyoto called for the United States to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by an insane 30 percent, which would have devastated not only the American but also the global economy. Developing nations, including two of the biggest polluters, India and China, were exempt from the accord. In 1997, the Senate declared by a vote of 95 to 0 that it would ratify no treaty that did not include everyone, effectively sinking Kyoto. And as for morally superior Europe, not a single major E.U. nation has yet ratified the accord.

America was created as an antidote to Europe. American "unilateralism," as its critics call it, has not produced anything like perfect leadership. But there are worse "isms" than unilateralism; three are imperialism, fascism, and communism. A century of American resolve, often in the face of European disdain, created a continent where not one of these lives as a serious force. Not bad.

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IRRITATING AND IRRELEVANT

By Jonah Goldberg

When you're out of power, you can obstruct. You can criticize. You can be unified in your "dismay" at the hard decisions of others. You can second-guess and pound the table. Sometimes these outsiders have something interesting to say, but sometimes they're just whiners and complainers. The beauty of the English language is that it has a word for such people. We call them "the Europeans."

O.K., that's a bit misleading. Most Europeans are decent, well-adjusted people. But when we're speaking of international politics "the Europeans" doesn't refer to these citizens; it refers to the continent's horde of bureaucrats, journalists, literati, and activists whose mental fecal impaction is so profound they cannot grasp—decades after the fact—that they are now the backseat drivers of history.

The last few years have sent European elites into paroxysms of idiocy. Environmental activists in Sweden planned a mock trial of President Bush as a "climate criminal." Throughout Europe, editorial pages brim with accusations that Bush is a dunce, a tool of the oil companies, no better than the Taliban.

For a decade, French bookstores have been saturated with anti-American treatises like *Who Is Killing France? The American Strategy*, *American Totalitarianism*, and *No Thanks, Uncle Sam.* The latter bestseller was written by a member of the French Parliament who concluded, "It is appropriate to be downright anti-American."

Of course, American contributions to world politics make those of "the Europeans" look downright malevolent. Europe's most significant political achievements in the twentieth century were: World War I, World War II, communism, fascism, colonial oppression, post-colonial upheaval, intellectual nihilism of every flavor, and now appeasement of pretty much anyone willing to say nasty words about the United States.

It's this last point that gets to the heart of the matter: Certain segments of the Left, both abroad and at home, simply believe that America is always wrong. Therefore anyone in opposition to America must be right. This explains why Hollywood morons and French intellectuals alike find the taste of Fidel Castro's posterior so palatable. This is also why "the Europeans" on the U.N. Human Rights Commission refuse to condemn Chinese human-rights abuses. They denounce American multinational corporations while permitting their own companies to trade with brutal nations like Sudan and Burma.

Europe is the historic birthplace of Western civilization, and therefore the world shall always owe it gratitude and respect. But Europe is not the future. We shouldn't think that Europe's perspective is completely irrelevant, but we shouldn't allow the histrionics of "the Europeans" to distract us from taking the right route.

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UNITED WE SHOULD STAND

By John O'Sullivan

America's ultimate interest in Europe is that European nations be reliable allies in a united West committed to liberal democracy. The combined power of America and Europe is so overwhelming that if the West remains united, it will dominate world politics and shape global rules along liberal democratic lines indefinitely.

What makes this an uncertain enterprise is the growing ideological disagreements within and between Western countries on the nature of the liberal democratic order and the classical system of nation-states it sustains. Progressive opinion holds that national sovereignty is discredited, patriotism atavistic, military force outmoded as a means of settling disputes, and that as a result power is rightly and inevitably shifting from nation-states to transnational organizations.

These new views are promoted most vigorously in Europe. In frustration, some Americans have concluded that Europe should be left to cultivate its post-modern garden, while America gets on with running the world.

But in reality, both the "American" and "European" viewpoints are found in both continents, and they are finely balanced in several important countries. There is no reason to concede Europe to the "national-interest-is-defunct" camp without a struggle, as this would only strengthen that faction everywhere—including in America, where the Democrats, the academy, the foreign policy establishment, and the media have already bought into much of the utopian internationalist view, as the Iraq debate has revealed.

Within Europe, attitudes are both varied and malleable. Small nations such as Belgium or Luxembourg are the firmest supporters of the shift from nation-states to supranational organizations, for the understandable reason that it augments rather than restrains their international influence. Being small nations, however, their ability to engineer that shift is very limited.

Germany has been the main stronghold of post-nation-state politics since the end of the Cold War. It remains the most pacifist political culture in Europe, but as its recent election demonstrated, those political strains are now mixed with an assertive German nationalism. That is producing a unilateralism that unsettles some other Europeans. France in particular might feel pushed somewhat toward the "American" view by unease over Germany's assertiveness during its election.

In Britain the debate between traditional national interests and a post-modern internationalism is very much an open contest. Though the Labour Party elite is infused with post-modern attitudes, most voters remain firmly attached to national symbols such as the pound sterling, hostile to further integration in a post-national Euro structure, and still prepared to play a military role on the world stage. They may have allies in the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, which are understandably keen to keep the national sovereignty they have just regained, generally preferring to trust their security to NATO and the U.S. rather than to international rules.

What transforms all these varied states into one post-national "Europe" is one thing only: the European Union. It is E.U. rules and institutions that represent the stronghold, the missionary order, and police force of the "European" view in world politics. The E.U. bureaucracy doesn't always manage to enforce its outlook on member states, but it increasingly tries to prohibit independent action outside of E.U. collective policy as it moves toward "ever-greater union." And the E.U. is animated by a spirit of rivalry toward the U.S. and of hostility toward "American" values. One example will illustrate all these points: If the common European foreign policy had been fully in place in the last few years, Britain would not have been permitted to join the U.S. in the air campaign to enforce the "No Fly Zone" over Iraq.

It is therefore clearly in America's national interest to shape a new Atlantic framework in which the E.U. would gradually lose its dominance within Europe. The steps towards such an outcome might include:

1) Replacing the venerable State Department policy of encouraging European "integration" in all circumstances with a policy of support for a decentralized, deregulated, free-trade Europe of nations;

2) Seeking closer bilateral relationships with European friends like the British, the east Europeans, the Italians, and the Spaniards;

3) Strengthening transatlantic institutions where they exist (like Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Force), establishing them where they don't (like a new transatlantic free trade area, TAFTA), and fostering an active transatlantic exchange.

If U.S. policy even began to move in these directions, it would galvanize those forces in European politics sympathetic to the "American" outlook. Ultimately, the Europeans would have to surrender their dream of independent superpower status, and the Americans would have to accept a degree of real European influence over alliance policy. But bound together, America and Europe would be able to ensure that the West continues to shape the direction of our world. That would surely be a better aim than our present policy of encouraging European states to integrate into an anti-American structure and then complaining that they seem increasingly anti-American.

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Democracy E.U.-style at the European Parliament in Brussels.

Economics and Politics in Today's Europe

By Richard Miniter

Once you get past the slanting rain under the steel gray sky in July, the Christmas decorations put up by Muslim workers under government contract, the piles of newstand pornography placed at toddler height, the dogs that get into barking duels from under the tables of upscale restaurants, and the fact that a pregnant woman will lend you her lighter to ignite your Cuban cigar, the most surprising thing about Brussels is the abject lack of self confidence.

This strange diffidence colors both the economies of the euro zone and the politics of the European Union.

By the numbers, Europe is probably the most important economic sector in the world. Thanks to decades of agreements stretching back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Western Europe is now a giant free trade zone of more than 300 million consumers. This makes it a larger market than the U.S. and Canada combined. Within recent years, consumer choice has improved vastly (Belgian consumers are now pleasantly shocked to find refrigerators with ice cube dispensers), and companies are now able to develop large economies of scale, like their American rivals. The "single market" as the eurocrats refer to it, is actually an historic triumph. Never before have all the European peoples been able to trade so freely across borders. Yet this grand achievement brings only shrugs from high-level bureaucrats and ordinary Europeans.

The other great economic achievement of the E.U. is the euro, the currency now in use from Dublin to Athens. The euro has created price transparency across Europe—people know exactly how much they will save by crossing the border to Luxembourg for gas, Britain for electronics, and Germany for books. This has increased competition and, where allowed by local governments, slashed prices in many places.

Indeed, all prices across the euro zone seem to be converging, as economists predicted. This is good news if you live in overpriced Helsinki, where a beer at a local, unhip bar will cost $16 for an eight-ounce glass. But if you live in Athens, one of the poorest major cities in Europe, the euro is not so welcome. *Kathimerini*, the Greek daily, recently compared the cost of staples such as coffee and bread in Brussels, Rome, Munich, London, and Athens—and found that prices have soared toward the European average in the Greek capital in the first

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nine months of the euro's introduction. Meanwhile, the typical Greek earns 30 percent less than the E.U. average. So prices are up and wages are not. Like the Greeks, the Portuguese and the Spanish have seen prices outpace wages, and blame the euro for their troubles.

The euro is causing similar problems in other areas. While the 12 members of the euro zone now share the same central bank and currency, they continue to have very different economies: Ireland is booming, Germany is floundering, and Portugal is sinking. With the euro, those countries can no longer use their national banks to make helpful corrections.

Some say that these sorts of tensions will ultimately tear the euro apart. I don't believe it. The European Central Bank seems to be managing the euro as a stable store of value, not a disposable currency that can be inflated to float over economic troughs. And that is a good thing. The history of the post-World War II currencies of Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg has been one of repeated devaluations and inflations, which undermined sustainable growth. Now that European politicians no longer have the power to inflate their money supply, all of Western Europe has sound money for the first time in 70 years. That is too great an advantage to throw away.

But again, this triumph inspires no self-esteem among Europeans. They find the euro convenient and necessary, but it strangely doesn't inspire pride.

Why doesn't the vast European economy make Europeans happy? Because they view big corporations as dishonest, vaguely criminal enterprises, and because they know unions and government have made strong future economic growth all but impossible.

European corporations disclose very little to their shareholders, and often pad their payrolls with cousins and cronies. In Germany, Europe's largest economy, most major companies have interlocking boards with their banks and suppliers. It is all very cozy, but doesn't inspire trust. When Belgium's biggest high-tech startup, Lernout & Hauspie, was found by the *Wall Street Journal Europe* to be cooking the books, American investors were shocked and angry. The Belgians just shrugged at the company's behavior, and suggested an American competitor had paid off the *Journal* for the exposé. A Belgian senator told me that, "It is the way things work everywhere in business." After three years of covering European business as a journalist, I can say it is certainly the way many European businesses seem to operate. And who can be proud of that?

And consider the regulatory restrictions that sap Europe's economic strength. On the Continent, stores must close by 7 p.m. and are not allowed to open at all on Sundays without a special hard-to-get permit. Sales are permitted only twice a year and must be held at the exact same time that all other local competitors are having their sales. The one exception: A store may have an anniversary sale, if the year of the anniversary is evenly divisible by 25. No, I'm not kidding—that is the law.

European labor laws are, if anything, much worse. Firing an employee can take up to two years, so any new job is created with great trepidation. Many positions have been automated away: Parking lot and car wash attendants are now machines—the only people you see are other customers. (Even the emergency number in the parking garage is automated.) In Belgium and France, any employee is entitled to a minimum of 26 paid national holidays—in addition to his vacation. The average German works nine and a half months per year, and, thanks to labor legislation pushed by unions, is paid for 14 and a half months. In Germany, the unemployed are entitled to a Christmas bonus, paid for by the taxpayer.

Here in the capital of Europe, nothing effervesces. Certainly not the political buildings that were intended to capture Europe's grandeur. Sit in a café in Place Luxembourg, and the immense glass and steel structure known as the European Parliament stretches toward the horizon in both directions. It looks like a beached ocean liner.

To some American critics, the European Union is dangerous. It is the battleship Bismarck—blunting powerful American corporations, blocking sales of American beef, corn, and bananas, and plotting to demolish American leadership in world affairs. They cite E.U. attacks on the U.S. over the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, repeated attempts to undermine President Bush's missile-defense shield, European stealth efforts to push the U.S. off the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and European hesitancy about fighting the war on terror. These observers see the E.U. as an emerging superpower to rival the U.S.

While there are elements of truth in these criticisms, they miss the bigger picture. The E.U. is a muddle, a bouillabaisse of various ingredients. Some of what it does should make many Americans cheer: dismantling numerous trade barriers among European nations and forcing the deregulation of many industries. E.U. directives require member states to privatize their post offices and telephone monopolies by the end of the decade. The E.U. recently forced Germany to stop subsidizing its state-run banks, deregulated electricity markets without California-style blackouts, and eliminated border-control posts across the continent. It is now as easy to drive from France to Germany as from Virginia to Maryland. As in the United States, the pulling down of internal European border controls has spurred trade and tourism.

Of course, there are also laughable examples of over-regulation. The E.U. recently issued rules requiring buses to have uniform designs—signs must be exactly so many centimeters above the floor, and the pitch of the passenger seats must be precisely calibrated. Other rules stipulate the speed of toilet-water flow and the temperature of beer. "It could be worse," a German lobbyist told me recently, "in Prussian times, we wrote laws telling people how to use a ladder."

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These intrusive regulations weigh down European businesses and raise prices for consumers. Many are written specifically to protect European companies from American and Japanese competition. Many more are written to safeguard the interests of Europe's politically powerful labor unions. Unions are so dominant that members of the European Parliament, who are obliged by treaty to meet for one week per month in a separate building in Strasbourg, France, timidly schedule their meetings around any hint of rail strikes. Blocks of back-up plane tickets are bought months in advance, just in case.

So today's European Union provides plenty of fodder for europhiles and europskeptics alike. On balance, there is little reason for Washington to fear Brussels. There seems scant threat that the E.U. will become a super-state capable of challenging America any time soon. Aside from support staff and an army of translators, the E.U. employs less than 3,000 mandarins—for a confederation of some 350 million people. The E.U. budget is roughly 1 percent of the E.U.'s combined gross national product (versus the U.S. federal government's more than 20 percent take). And substantial changes in the E.U. are harder to engineer than amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Nor is the euro about to displace the dollar as a world currency.

"The single market and currency increasingly appear not as the first major steps toward a political union, but as the finishing touches on the construction of a European economic zone," argues Andrew Moravesik in *Foreign Affairs*. One hopes he is right. Though boneheaded regulations will continue to cascade, pointless trade disputes will keep simmering, and plenty of left-wing bluster will still be heard, there are good reasons to think Mr. Moravesik will be right. Consider the E.U.'s history.

It began as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, a post-World War II effort to speed up rebuilding. The Treaty of Rome, in 1958, created the European Economic Community. This ultimately gave rise to the common market, a Europe-wide free-trade zone, and numerous supra-national institutions like the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Court of Justice. (The European Parliament came much later, in 1978.)

Part of what makes the E.U. confusing to Americans is that each of its institutions seems to do a bit of everything. The Commission, now composed of 20 members selected by 15 national governments, is a hodgepodge of executive, legislative, and judicial functions. It oversees the work of agencies, known as Directorates General (DG), that have much more power than American cabinet departments or regulatory agencies—including the power to write legislation (although it must be approved later by the other institutions), enforce the rules they write (sometimes over the determined opposition of national governments), and interpret the rules (like American courts do).

There are very few checks and balances. Europe's courts cannot overturn these regulations unless they violate a specific treaty provision, which is rare. Individual citizens or businesses cannot bring a case to overturn a regulation, only that rule's application to themselves. Commission employees can't easily be reined in, as they are not appointed by commissioners or elected officials but rather by a Civil Service-like procedure. They can only be transferred, not fired. "Maybe if they sleep with a commissioner's wife. Maybe," says a Dutch Commission staffer. He's not joking.

Nor are there external checks on their authority. Bureaucrats are not required to open their meetings to the public. Reporters have no "Freedom of Information Act"—like powers to force the E.U. departments to release documents. Not that they would use them if they did—many European reporters are funded directly by national governments or indirectly through political parties. In Brussels all journalists must register and have government-issued "press cards," which can be taken away at government discretion. These controls are rarely necessary anyway—the Continental press is a compliant bunch. Attend the daily press briefing at the Commission and you'll hear lots of questions like "When will the quarterly agriculture report be released?" If it gets too tedious, journalists can wander a few steps outside the briefing room to the subsidized bar.

And while the 20 commissioners can kill or rewrite the legislation that is drafted for them by unelected junior staffers, they usually timidly adopt most of what the bureaucrats hand them. "About 95 percent of what the Directorates General write is taken on board by the Commission," estimates Rod Hunter, a lawyer-lobbyist working in Brussels for the past decade.

Tracing a bill through the alphabet soup of the Brussels bureaucracy may be the best way to see how the system works—and why it is unlikely to make Europe a mighty global force.

Say you're 25 and have just passed the E.U.'s demanding civil-service exam. You've landed on the approved-to-hire list and after waiting a few years for a job to open up have been offered a spot at some humble DG, say "Environment" or "Information Society." (Yes, that's a real agency. Don't ask what it does; it has more unrelated missions than the U.S. Commerce Department.)

You like the huge, tax-free salary and generous benefits. You show up at a brand-new building in central Brussels, brimming with confidence. You now have the power of a U.S. Congressional staffer, a federal regulator, and a judge all rolled into one. Your agency itself is a cross between a Congressional committee and an executive agency.

After a few months, you've tired of helping colleagues develop their regulations. Having learned the ropes, you want to create some of your own rules. Maybe a corporation or union has sent you a binder full of ideas. Maybe you dreamt them up yourself. Perhaps you decide that "Europe" needs common standards on bicycle brakes. Too late; that's already been done. So you focus on bicycle tires instead. Different member-states have different regu-

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lations on the width of bicycle tires. That, you say, creates "unfair trade." (No one mentions that tire makers are doing just fine.) So after a few internal meetings and a nod from your "head of unit"—the 40-something bureaucrat in charge of a few dozen junior bureaucrats like you—you draft the legislation.

Next comes "consultation." You send the paperwork to the low-level government workers who regulate bicycle tires in the 15 national governments. They almost invariably support more controls. They have a few ideas of their own, and the draft gets amended. Sometimes a pet idea is inserted that some national regulator couldn't get his own government to pass. Within a year or two, all those unelected administrators sign off.

You send the draft up the chain at your Directorate General. Another set of unelected officials takes a look. Finally, the head of the DG, unelected of course, approves it. Then comes "interdepartmentalism." The unelected guys at the other DGs get a crack. This is often the first instance of political resistance. Different DGs plump for different interest groups and nations. DG Trade wonders if it'll cause problems with Japan or the U.S., DG Legal doesn't want to have to defend it at the World Trade Organization. DG Agriculture, dominated by French interests, frets that the rule may upset Michelin. DG Employment looks it over with one eye on the unions. The draft is adjusted to protect key constituencies, and some DGs sign on in exchange for your DG's support of one of *their* drafts.

Usually, the five to seven personal staffers of each commissioner—known as their "cabinets"—play dealmaker. They push for the interests of the commissioner, or his home government, or the Directorate General that reports to him (though technically the commissioners represent only the pure interests of "Europe"). Perhaps the best player of this inside game is E.U. Commissioner for Trade Pascal Lamy. A former chief of staff to another commissioner, he knows all the arcane internal rules. He knows when changes can be made on the sly—like when a draft is translated into each of the 12 official E.U. languages. He and other savvy operators know the points where any changes are forbidden, and he uses those junctures to block initiatives he opposes.

Lamy and others like him have mastered the art of dropping friends and allies, often of strategic nationalities, into key posts in the bureaucracy that are technically outside their official control. This allows them to get inside information about key proposals long before the process of formal circulation begins.

Once the Directorates General agree, the new law goes to the Commission itself. It is usually passed unanimously. When anyone balks, he is told to be a "good European." It's kind of like being told not to be such a racist in America.

At this point, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament take a whack at the new law. The Council is composed of heads of state, so it usually delegates authority to the relevant government ministers (recycling bills go to Environment ministers, for example). These ministers are usually elected to represent a small district in their member country, then appointed by their party to run the agency in question. Their interest is to enlarge the power of that agency and maybe become prime minister one day. If the ministers can't agree, the prime ministers—the Council of Europe—get involved. In most cases, Council support does not have to be unanimous, a "qualified majority" will do.

Meanwhile, the European Parliament is beavering away. The parliament has long been derided as nothing but a "talk shop." That is changing; it recently acquired the power to approve the Commission's budget, amend legislation, and compel Commission staff to testify. Most of the potential power of the legislative branch remains unrealized, however. Its members tend to be either old lawmakers whose careers stalled in their national parliaments, or young party loyalists seeking a stepping stone to political office back home.

When any bill hits the parliament, the various political parties appoint "reporteurs" to study its technical details and recommend how party members should vote. So usually only a handful of 626 members of parliament have actually read the bill. The parties regularly negotiate with other parties to create a block of votes. Party-line and block-line votes are common. There are no filibusters and few other delaying tactics. Most bills pass with the first vote. Bills can be amended at a "second reading"—and that's when the restaurants near the parliament are abuzz with dealmaking. If a bill fails on "third reading," it must go back to the Commission for redrafting.

When a bill passes the European Parliament and the European Council, it is law. A failed initiative means years of negotiating down the drain—something no one wants to take the blame for. So most bills pass, in some form.

This is not exactly a formula for nimbleness. The entire system is primed to produce more and more regulations. Nor does it build popular support; democratically accountable officials only become involved late in the game, and so have little ability to do more than edit the legislation. On any given day, the real influence lies in dozens of secret meetings in Brussels between various unelected bureaucrats. (The Commission staff is aware of this issue and refers to it as the "democratic deficit.")

Watch this process up close for a while, and you may become gloomy about Europe's future vitality. The E.U. often looks like a machine ready-made for cranking out socialist legislation. And it is. But the forces of economic liberalism appear to me to be winning, trimming away barriers to trade, sensibly pushing deregulation and privatization. There is a growing consensus in Brussels that Europe needs freer markets, albeit without upsetting too many home-country interest groups.

Americans should not worry that the European Union might succeed; they should worry that it might fail.

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

EUROPE LOSES ITS MIND

By Michael Ledeen

Almost all of my adult life I have been a Europhile. I lived in Europe for the better part of 11 years, and considered myself lucky, because the thing I cherish most—good, informed intellectual conversation with people who know a lot about history and enjoy talking politics and philosophy—was better there. Intellectuals were more appreciated in Europe. Even though we lived in miserable apartments in Italy for several years, without heat or hot water in a fifth-floor walkup that was hell to reach if you had a baby carriage in one hand, the groceries in the other, and the baby strapped to your back, I enjoyed high social status because I was a "professor."

All this flowed automatically from well-established European convictions. Culture was important. The best ideas came from cultured people. Therefore the things that cultured people did, like writing books or composing music or designing buildings, were treated with appreciation and respect.

In contrast, American intellectual life seemed less interesting during the 1960s and '70s. Certainly conversation was much less challenging. Most Americans didn't know beans about history, even their own. Virtually no one in the United States knew anything serious about the stuff I was working on—Italian fascism and other nasty mass movements. Europe was my real home, the place I went for cultural nourishment, for intellectual stimulation, and for imaginative political thinking.

Today, all that has changed. Now, conversation is much better in America. Intellectual creativity is incomparably greater. Both the number and the variety of truly stimulating magazines—the favorite medium of intellectuals—are far greater here than in Europe.

But even without the comparison to the United States, with all its current dynamism in the life of the mind, the European intellectual scene has become almost unbelievably boring. Talks with European intellectuals often bring nothing but whining and self-justification. Though Americans are now concerned about anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism, and other unhappy aspects of European culture, these are not new developments. What *is* new and troubling is that Europeans have gone brain dead. There is no energy there, no spark of imagination, none of the intellectual playfulness I found when I first set foot on the continent in the mid 1960s.

Out of the last 50 Nobel winners in physics and chemistry, only 12 were Europeans. European novelists defined contemporary literature for decades, but no more. European movies used to put Hollywood to shame. Now European flicks are rarely worth watching; even Iranian movies are better. Most of the European press has lost any semblance of independence, having long since surrendered to the enforcers of political correctness and sold its soul for invitations to the best dinner parties and unmerited awards from one another.

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The resurgence of European chauvinism and other ugliness is closely related to the collapse of Old World intellectualism. It's as if the only way Europeans can assert themselves is by embracing the excesses of previous generations. There is a growing sense of inferiority among Europeans—an accurate recognition that Europe counts for much less than it used to.

Many Europeans realize that their current irrelevance is largely the result of their own freely made decisions and their own lack of enterprise. First and foremost, Europe has refused to take up the heavy lifting of modern warfare, choosing to buy lots of "butter" and few "guns." As their defense and R & D budgets shrank ever smaller, Europe's ability to fight alongside the United States shrank as well. Before the invasion of Afghanistan earlier this year, American leaders informed NATO that the U.S. really didn't need European participation in the fighting, that we would do the whole thing along with the British—who have kept up much better than the continentals. This produced primal screams from the European defense ministers, who realized it would be a political humiliation. They accordingly insisted that America find a role for them, and it was done.

By failing to assume the most basic responsibility of defending themselves, the Europeans implicitly put their destiny in our hands. But rather than face this unpleasant truth, European leaders have scrambled to find a scapegoat for their own malfeasance. The only available candidate is the United States. Instead of admitting their own fecklessness, they accuse us of bloody thinking. Instead of taking steps to improve their military power, they denounce us for overwhelming other nations.

At the same time, they wheel and deal with the world's worst dictators. The Europeans continue to negotiate fresh deals with the terror masters in Iran and Iraq today, ranging from aircraft sales to oil exploration contracts. And not just in the Middle East; European countries have done everything in their power to provide modern military technology to communist China, and not a single deputy in the European Parliament has stood up and asked if this policy was really in the interests of the Western world.

Giving up on the capacity for self defense has enormous consequences for any nation. It is always part of a process of turning inward, of self-indulgence. The big political debates in Europe today are not over war and peace, but over pasta and cheese. The fights in Brussels are over how many new regulations to impose on European manufacturers, European workers, European doctors and lawyers. The E.U. is simply not working through the question of how to deal with the threat from radical Islamic terrorism.

Throughout the Cold War, Europeans saw themselves as wise, experienced, and thoughtful counselors to the American Prince. But their general loss of enterprise and imagination now undercuts them. Instead of trying to inform and guide, they merely whine and spit at us.

Of course they are angry; we have shown them up badly. Our ability to dominate the world, intellectually as well as militarily, is the clearest possible proof of their own failure. And they are reminded daily of their impotence by our obvious lack of concern over the possibility that they might opt out of today's war against the terror masters.

This is only their latest humiliation, following years of cultural embarrassment in book stores (top American authors are translated into all the European languages yet there is relatively little cross-pollination among Europeans themselves), in theaters (where American movies are far more popular with their own people than local ones), on the field of business (where most European companies have been followers rather than leaders for decades), and elsewhere.

Only 12 out of 50 recent Nobel prize winners in science were Europeans.

Back in the 1960s, things were a lot different. But there is no contemporary equivalent of the Gunnar Myrdals, the Raymond Arons, the Luigi Barzinis, or the Albert Camus of those times. Today's European intellectuals have turned selfish, utterly materialistic, and lacking in independent thought. European politics now revolves around the quest for guaranteed material comfort—shorter work weeks, longer vacations, earlier retirement, and cushier pensions.

Perhaps the worst part of Europeans' brain death is their supine embrace of their announced enemies. During the Cold War, there was no shortage of European intellectuals who actively appeased the Soviet Union, but there was always a strong majority in favor of the defense of the West. To the surprise of many Americans, there was a 1980s revival of courage among the French intelligentsia, for instance, above all those known as the "new philosophers." Young former leftists came to see that Solzhenitsyn was right, and that Soviet tyranny had to be condemned. Alas, there is no similar revival these days, as we see in the shocking silence of so many European elites in the face of radical Islam.

Civilizations have their ups and downs, and Europe will likely rouse itself from its current torpor and self-indulgence to once again play a major role in the affairs of the world. It's happened before. The Dark Ages gave way to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. After Western armies were defeated by Muslim forces for centuries, the tide was eventually turned at the gates of Vienna late in the seventeenth century.

We can only hope this happens again soon.

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SCANDINAVIA'S SURPRISING TURN FROM SOCIALISM

By Eli Lehrer

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Since the early 1990s the four nations of Scandinavia have opened their economies to international competition, chopped taxes, and pruned regulations. In Denmark and Norway, market-oriented parties now control the government. Parties of the Right won the largest single chunk of the vote in the most recent Finnish elections, and they make up a vigorous and growing opposition which nearly wrested away political control in Sweden this year. All around the Baltic, a small but lively movement committed to market economics and individual liberty has mounted a challenge to Scandinavia's long socialistic status quo.

Even as the European Union bloats welfare bureaus and launches regulatory regimes that strangle individual initiative and free enterprise, the countries in Europe's north are headed in a different direction. All the Scandinavian nations except Norway rank among the world's 25 most free economies (ahead of nations such as France and Austria), according to the Heritage Foundation/*Wall Street Journal* Index of Economic Freedom. Denmark's economy is actually ranked freer than the United Kingdom's.

The Nordic countries first established strong welfare states in the 1920s and 1930s. Benefits for the middle as well as lower classes became lavish, and Social Democrats raised income taxes until they became the world's highest. Despite this, Scandinavian socialism was in some ways less intense than other European varieties. Unlike governments in France, England, and Germany, Scandinavian states owned and ran very few companies other than public utilities and railroads. Companies like Saab, Ericsson, Nokia, and Volvo have always belonged to stockholders.

Scandinavia's marginal tax rates on wages, and the value added taxes (which are assessed like sales taxes) remain the highest in the world. But capital gains taxes and real estate assessments are low or non-existent. And the region is actually ahead of the United States in a few areas of market reforms: All four countries have school vouchers and allow or will soon allow individual control over some social security taxes.

When it comes to European integration, Scandinavians have shown an independent streak. Norway has stayed out of the European Union's formal structures—although it does have a free trade agreement with the E.U.—while Denmark and Sweden both joined only after reserving the right to opt out of certain parts of the Union (neither has adopted the euro). Only Finland has wholeheartedly embraced the E.U. Not coincidentally, it is also the only Scandinavian country without a politically influential free-market movement.

The Swedish think tank Timbro serves as the epicenter of classical-liberal thought in the region. Under the leadership of journalist Mattias Bengtsson and Marxist-turned-libertarian Mauricio Rojas, the institute (which is funded mostly by large Swedish corporations) has pushed for welfare reform, free trade, and more capitalism. "We are working for a long-term shift in the public opinion in favor of free markets, entrepreneurship, private property, and an open society," Bengtsson describes his organization's goals.

Johan Norberg, 29, has emerged as Timbro's most visible activist. His book *In Defense of Global Capitalism* sold well in Sweden and, in translation, has become a minor classic of the American Right. Through a mixture of personal anecdote, political philosophizing, and number crunching, Norberg makes a convincing moral and economic case that global capitalism helps the world's poor. He shows that global trade has improved people's lives the world over. While Norberg says that he would have voted for George Bush over Al Gore, he hardly compares to a conventional American conservative. He says that he doesn't particularly care if government policies promote traditional families and (like almost everyone I talked to in the Scandinavian market-liberal movement) supports legal abortion and gay rights. (The handful of American-style social conservatives in Scandinavia generally support a lavish welfare state.)

Across the Baltic, another unconventional thinker has made waves in both hemispheres. Danish statistician Bjørn Lomborg's book *The Skeptical Environmentalist* is an ambitious exposé of distortions by radical environmentalists

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(see *TAE*, March 2002, p. 40). On topics from species extinction to global warming, Lomborg refutes nearly every Green scare story, and his data-driven work has drawn significant interest in America. Lomborg, however, is uncomfortable being associated with the Right. "I'm rather a new kind of left-wing that tries to get back to the original redistributive goals," of the Left, rather than a belief in a gloomy state of the world he tells *TAE*.

The Road from Serfdom in Estonia

By Jeremy Hildreth

The resurgent nation of Estonia is at once immensely modern and impressively ancient. Located on the Baltic Sea right below Finland and about even with Stockholm, Estonia covers the same area as New Hampshire and Vermont combined, and has a population of 1.4 million. Its smallness, however, belies the magnitude of its resurgence.

Forget startup companies. Emerging after two generations under the thumb of the Soviet Union, Estonia is an entire startup country, and opportunities abound. In the capital of Tallinn, I visited my friend Oliver, a native Estonian who had spent seven years in the United States—four at university and three as a management consultant—before returning to pursue entrepreneurial ventures here rather than in America.

The Soviet occupation that began violently in 1940 concluded abruptly on August 20, 1991. Many scars remain. There is poverty, and the memory of it, and the accompanying habits of austerity, particularly among the older generation. There is physical damage: rundown buildings, lackluster public works, and blemished landscapes, especially visible beyond the famously gorgeous medieval downtown. There are psychological scars, too. Former Communist Party members lost privileges or jobs even as they gained their freedom. "Some in the older generations have had a hard time adapting to a market-based economy," Oliver says. "There can be some bitterness." After the Berlin Wall fell, he notes, Germans sometimes behaved as if it were still there. "They called it 'The wall in the mind.' People have been shaped under different systems and sometimes have trouble understanding each other."

On the whole, however, Estonians have turned rapidly toward markets and democracy. "Regulation is a tricky thing. It's better to have no regulation than to have bad regulation," says Oliver's friend Heikke, a principal at a top Estonian investment bank. A surprising number of 20- and 30-something Estonians that I met expressed similar sentiments against economic intrusion by the state. Some picked up free-market notions from American sources. Oliver's girlfriend Anneli told me how important Voice of America radio had been to her family during her childhood. ("At the time, my parents said not to tell anyone at school that we listened," she explained.)

In the 2002 Index of Economic Freedom, Estonia has leapt into the number four slot, right up with the U.S. The former Soviet republic is cited for its 26 percent flat tax on personal income, non-existent corporate income tax, and near-zero import duties. Estonia's GDP has grown an average of 5 percent per year, in real terms, over the last half decade.

And what have Estonians done with their newfound prosperity? For one thing, they've bought lots of computers and cell phones. The country is so thoroughly wired it has been dubbed, somewhat breathlessly, "e-stonia." The government even announced plans to hold future elections on line. Considered by many to be the brain center of the former Soviet Union, Estonia now devotes more money to information technology, as a share of GDP, than Western nations like Germany and the U.K., and has more Internet hosts per capita than Germany, the U.K. and France. Hansapank, the country's largest bank, has 280,000 retail customers who bank on line. That's a fifth of the entire population.

What's more, Estonia possesses an indispensable asset for substantial long-term growth that some of its counterparts lack: a working financial sector. Although rooted in the bank-centric German model, Estonia is broadening its stock markets. The Tallinn Stock Exchange, in business since 1996, is completely electronic. I paid it a visit, hoping to see the floor, and instead saw a small room with a big computer in it; all of the traders were in offices elsewhere. Exchange CEO Gert Tiivas, educated at Bentley College in Massachusetts and George Washington University in Washington, D.C., told me the key to nurturing an equity market: honesty. "If we cannot say that we are an open and transparent market...investors will flee, as has occurred in countries ranging from Russia to the Czech Republic."

In regard to Estonia's joining the European Union, an event set to occur around 2004, there is little doubt about its ability to fit in. Despite its Soviet past, Estonia has enduring and close cultural ties to Western Europe, particularly Scandinavia. And while there's room for further development (its per capita GDP is one seventh that of the U.S.), Estonia remains perhaps the most dramatic national success story of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Estonia's is one of those precious and inspiring stories in which the good guys—freedom, property rights, and technology—triumph against odds that are always far too long.

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state's responsibilities. While the book's first half relies heavily on market thinkers like Ayn Rand and Ludwig von Mises, the prescriptions in the second half are far more modest: He proposes a gradual phase-out of many welfare programs rather than their immediate abolition.

As prime minister, Rasmussen got off to a slow but promising start: He appointed Lomborg to head a new research institute dedicated to cost-benefit assessment of government regulations, privatized a national TV station, and began a major overhaul of the nation's tax and social security systems. Rasmussen has also enthusiastically supported the war on terror and sent Danish troops to Afghanistan.

While market-oriented activists admire the prime minister, he has not pursued the purist agenda some of them dreamed of. "I wouldn't say we're disappointed in him," says Nikolaj Gammeltoft, editor of the Danish libertarian journal *Libertas*. He was elected, after all, on the platform that "he wanted to save the welfare state by reforming it."

Norway has the most regulated economy in Scandinavia today, yet is embarking on the most radical privatization plan in the region. Thanks to strong oil revenues, Norway may actually become the first nation to fully privatize its social security system (by purchasing annuities for all beneficiaries). While Christian Democrat prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik is not a market-oriented reformer at heart, his coalition partners—including the Conservative and Liberal parties—have pressed him in that direction.

Norway's pro-market movement remains underdeveloped, however. Jan Arild Snoen, an Oslo-based journalist who was once active in the Progress Party, says that "right now, there are plenty of Norwegians who understand that markets and personal freedom are important, and even more who just don't want to pay enormous taxes." But there remain few formal institutions to promote economic freedom. The Progress Party—which once promoted a free-market agenda—has moved in a populist direction, renouncing its opposition to the welfare state and attacking immigration as the source of many of Norway's problems; this has increased the party's electoral success. It now serves as a linchpin of prime minister Bondevik's coalition.

Scandinavia's shift toward open markets and individual liberty is balanced by some countervailing forces. "There is almost no center amongst people my age," explains Norberg. "You see a great appeal of market-oriented ideas among the young, but also an equally great appeal of the Green Left." It's clear, though, that the generational shift has brought new debates to the northern reaches of Europe. Snoen believes the pro-market movement will continue to grow among the young. "They grew up when socialism was holding them back. They've been to the United States and seen what life is like there," he says. "They want more freedom."

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decide what they want to build. The central government in Baghdad would control defense, foreign policy, national infrastructure, and common resources. There's no reason to impose another dictator on Iraq.

TAE: Could the Iraqi National Congress lead the country?

RUBIN: I think it could. The INC has a democratic platform. Democracies scare Arab rulers to death because Arab rulers are unpopular among their people. Iraq, however, has always been a trendsetter and it can be again. It's also important to remember that the INC isn't a single group, but an umbrella organization. The two Kurdish groups I mentioned are members. We should hold the INC accountable, but there's nothing to indicate it would be dictatorial.

TAE: How loyal is the Iraqi army to Saddam Hussein?

RUBIN: It's not. In December of 2000, U.S. and British warplanes flew low over the Iraqi lines, and 138 Iraqi troops threw down their weapons and surrendered without a shot being fired. There have been coup attempts. Both the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard have engaged in coup plotting. Saddam's own son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, defected to Jordan to spill the beans on how Saddam was trying to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. If Saddam can't keep even his own family, his own special forces loyal to him, there is no way he has the support of the army. In any liberation action against Iraq the question is whether the Iraqi army is even going to fight at all.

TAE: How would you expect a war to proceed?

RUBIN: When you have a hornet's nest you want to do one of two things: Leave it alone or get rid of it. The worst possible thing you can do is walk up to it, whack it with a stick a few times, stir up all the hornets, and leave. Past U.S. administrations haven't done much else. This is what the Iraqis are worried about. In 1996, Bill Clinton sent some cruise missiles into the Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad after midnight. If Bill Clinton wanted to take serious action against Iraq, he would have rocketed the intelligence headquarters during the middle of the day when everyone is there, because the problem isn't the building, and it's not the cleaning ladies. If the U.S. is serious, I would expect to see a concerted air attack and a maneuver to separate Saddam Hussein from his oil money by blockading Iraq's 36-mile coastline along the Persian Gulf. If Saddam is separated from his money he won't be able to buy people off. People talk about Saddam being a survivor. But so are his henchmen. They may very well see it in their interest to throw down their weapons —or turn them on their leadership.

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A Crosswise Look at Britain's Monarchy

By Bill Kauffman

Americans instinctively disdain monarchy. "There is not a crowned head in Europe whose talents or merits would entitle him to be elected vestryman by the people in any parish in America," wrote Thomas Jefferson to George Washington. By blood and heritage, Americans are contemptuous of kings and queens and their footmen: the liveried drivers, scraping equerries, and sycophantic counselors. We call no man Lord except Jesus Christ, and we even prefer to call Him by His first name.

Tom Paine, who believed an hereditary ruler to be "as absurd as an hereditary mathematician, or an hereditary wiseman, and as ridiculous as an hereditary poet laureate," imagined the game to be almost up. In *The Rights of Man* (1792), he gave European monarchy seven years, tops. Surely, as the nineteenth century dawned the sun would set on the whole monarchical mess, which was just "a thing kept up to amuse the ignorant, and quiet them into paying taxes."

Alas, Paine's prediction was in Jeane Dixon's league. God may not have saved the Queen, but something sure did. British royalty, if lacking in formal powers, has outlived Tom Paine.

Our English cousins have endured a monarchic millennium interrupted only by those 11 years in the mid seventeenth century when Oliver Cromwell stole the scepter. Still, anti-monarchism has an ancient and honorable pedigree in England. As early as the twelfth century the cry went up that "Londoners shall have no king but their mayor!" There have always been Englishmen as spirited as the seventeenth-century Leveller

TAE *associate editor Bill Kauffman's* Dispatches from the Muckdog Gazette *will be published this winter.*

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Richard Rumbold, who proclaimed before his hanging, "I am sure there was no man born marked of God above another; for no man comes into the world with a saddle on his back, neither any booted and spurred to ride him."

We are told that the monarchy embodies a "dignified" aspect of the state. It is said to provide a "focus for patriotism" and national identity—as though the England of Waterloo sunsets and Jamesian ghosts needs welfare mums in tiaras to protect it.

In *The English Constitution* (1867), which every fledgling prince reads as a child, Walter Bagehot explained, "The best reason why Monarchy is a strong government is that it is an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it, and they hardly anywhere in the world understand any other." Or so Kings like to think.

With the British sovereign's role having been reduced to inutility, we are far from Alexander Pope's "The right divine of kings to govern wrong." Yet the prime minister still bows to the Queen and kisses her soft hands, uncalloused by even the drawing of her own drapes in the morning.

The sovereign also remains the titular head of the Church of England, which might have caused a national throat-clearing had Princess Diana married her lover Dodi Fayed. In that case the future King William, Defender of the Faith, would have had a Muslim stepfather. Then again, at least the Muslims in England *believe*. The empty Anglican churches have forced preservationist Englishmen to start answering Philip Larkin's question: "When churches fall completely out of use/What shall we turn them into?"

The current band of throne-sitters are no more English than was the late lamented Dodi. The winsome Windsors are of German stock, which proved embarrassing during the First World War, when King George V and cousin Kaiser Wilhelm found their nations at war, while another member of the royal cousinage, Tsar Nicholas II, was nearing the end of his run.

In 1917, as atrocity stories of Huns bayoneting Belgian babes cast Germans in a rather bad light, King George V thought it advisable to change the family surname from the wurst-reeking Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to the impeccably English Windsor. The royals might still be an "imported dynasty," as H. G. Wells denounced them, but by golly that was one classy name.

The name change was carried off as deftly as Cordozer Broadus became Snoop Dogg or Chris Miller became Rat Scabies. Kaiser Wilhelm once joked that he was off to the theater to take in a production of *The Merry Wives of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha*. Meanwhile, the current Queen's husband, Prince Philip, a product of separated parents who spent his boyhood bouncing among the wastrel rich, bears the family name Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, which he sensibly changed to Mountbatten.

The Windsors are a parody of a family, of alternately brutal and distant fathers and neglectful mothers. Avaricious and acquisitive, they purchase everything but the love of their children, who warp into titled adults. In the many accounts of the family, most if not all written by monarchists, one is hard-pressed to find evidence of the normal love between a husband and wife, or parent and child. The dominant note was struck by Edward VIII, who said upon the death of his mother, Queen Mary, in 1953, "I somehow feel that the fluids in her veins must always have been as icy-cold as they now are in death." Rest in peace, Freezer Queen.

Adultery is to this family as swingsets are to six-year-olds. The dissolute Edward abdicated in 1936 when his inamorata, the sluttish American divorcee Wallis Simpson, was deemed not of queenly material, but later royals have made Edward and Wallis look like a match made in Eden.

The infamous Diana Spencer had no more respect for the marriage vow than did Wallis Simpson, but, unlike Wallis, Diana was feminine and spoke with the upper-class English accent that reduces American newsmen to uncharted depths of obsequiousness. Diana was a suicidally depressed adulterous bulimic, which made her the "most celebrated woman of the century," in biographer Christopher Anderson's words. A day wasn't a day 'til she had vomited six times. While pregnant with William she cut herself in any number of ways, once throwing her body againt a glass case. She was into astrology, not Anglicanism. She was also a votary of aroma therapy, t'ai chi, feng shui, acupuncture, colonic irrigation, and the healing power of crystals.

Diana could barely be bothered with her sons, kenneling them at early ages in the bleak boarding schools which produce the British upper class. When she died in a car crash with a spoiled rich kid, she hadn't seen her precious boys in five weeks. The lads "were never far from her thoughts," her hagiographer assures us, though they seldom seem to have been in her presence.

Then again, Diana was bred not to give a damn about her children. Her mother had walked out on the family when Diana was six, leaving her to the not so tender mercies of abusive nannies and a wicked stepmother she nicknamed "Acid Raine." Diana was shipped off to a boarding school and then a Swiss finishing academy, where she learned that a family is what you call the alcoholic strangers with whom you spend Christmas. This is hardly unique to the Spencer-Windsor match; Electress Sophia, mother of the Hanoverian line, wrote of her own dear mother: "Her Majesty had her whole

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

family brought up apart from herself, preferring the sight of her monkeys and dogs to that of her children." (The current queen has her beloved corgis.) Even the earliest British sovereigns were "brought up in foster-age," writes an historian of the monarchy, which "removed them from the infection of royal intrigue and rivalries"—not to mention parental affection.

G. K. Chesterton bemoaned the indifference of well-to-do English parents toward their offspring, as they "exiled all their children to boarding school, and thought any boy a milksop who admitted any affection for his mother." Nannies and boarding schools misshaped the English upper class. They fed a coldness, a lack of sympathy for others, an inability to form lasting bonds.

Diana's adulterous husband was also raised in an emotional fridge. As a boy, Charles received affection from nannies, not mummy: Even after extended absences, the Queen greeted him with only a handshake. His father, Prince Philip, was away for six of the boy's first eight birthdays.

Charles may have been a distant husband to the Princess of Wails, but how many hysterical suicide-threatening scenes can a man take? Besides, his mistress Camilla Parker-Bowles ("The Rottweiler" to Diana) had the right lineage. Parker-Bowles's ancestor Alice Keppel was Edward VII's mistress. When Camilla met Charles in 1972, she is said to have gamely suggested, "My great-grandmother and your great-great-grandfather were lovers. So how about it?"

As Queen Elizabeth's reign shows no sign of letting up, Charles must be in a state rather like that of Edward, Queen Victoria's son who muttered in 1897, "I don't mind praying to an Eternal Father, but I must be the only man in the country afflicted with an eternal mother." And so a nation turns its eyes to William, whose character was molded at boarding school, fantasizing about Ginger Spice and Cindy Crawford and hearing rumors of a celebrity called Mother who danced away her nights with coke fiends.

Grandpa will be of little help to William. Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, is best known for making boorish remarks about aborigines, Chinese, and other exotic breeds during his taxpayer-funded trips 'round the world. Ah, that royal charm.

The Queen's accumulated wealth, which is pegged at anywhere from 275 million pounds to over 1 billion pounds, is exempt from the inheritance tax. The royal subsidy runs to about 35 million pounds annually, by the reckoning of the Queen's accountants: Mere chicken scratch, say her defenders.

If it's not all that expensive, and if the queen's governing powers are slight, why bother abolishing the monarchy? Certainly it is no American's business if Englishmen wish to bow before even the most abject nitwits of the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha line. As Jefferson wrote in 1798, "I do not indeed wish to see any nation have a form of government forced on them." But, he continued, should England be "republicanized, I know not on what principle a true republican of our country could lament it."

Columnist Jonathan Freedland of *The Guardian*, a leading republican, argues that "the crown symbolises the very essence of our political culture—declaring loud and clear that power in Britain flows from the top down, with the throne at the summit of the pyramid. So long as the head of state belongs, automatically and irreversibly, to a single pampered family, we can but be subjects of their kingdom, not citizens of our own land."

British republicans tend to prefer an elected president and a constitution patterned after that of the United States. Alas, any new constitution would likely be written by a pasty technocrat of Cool Brittania rather than by James Madison. As one British conservative scornful of the royal family says resignedly, "I'd rather have the Queen than President Blair."

While the Windsors continue to go their not-so-merry way, prospects for republicans are growing brighter. In 1936, in the wake of Edward's abdication, Member of Parliament James Maxton offered a motion to abolish the monarchy in favor of a republic. He lost by the Sovietish margin of 403-5. Today, opinion polls find that about one quarter of Englishmen support an elected president rather than a monarch.

Maybe it doesn't much matter *what* the umbrella-poppers do with their buckteethed royals. Whether or not England survives has nothing to do with the thousand banalities yet to be spoken by the future King William, and everything to do with the concerns of Oliver Goldsmith:

> Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade;
> A breath can make them, as a breath has made;
> But a bold peasantry, their country's pride,
> When once destroy'd, can never be supplied.

If the English measure in meters, watch *Friends*, take orders from Brussels, and ban hunting, then what, really, does it matter if a King or Queen smiles benignantly over the lowing herd? If the London sky loses its hue, who cares who bows to whom?

Still, the Woman of the Century must be heeded. Diana is said to have remarked shortly before her death: "William is waiting patiently for the monarchy to be abolished. It will make it so much easier for him!"

In memory of the Princess of Whales, Free Willy!

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

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

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This Old House

© Dynamic Graphics

By Blake Hurst

TARKIO, MISSOURI—We live in an agricultural region that has just endured a record drought. The stock market is in a swoon. So is the local economy. We decided to celebrate by buying a house.

Mind you, our decision was made even tougher by family pressures.

Julie and I started married life in a four-room tenant house with no central heat or air conditioning. The pipes froze with regularity, and the electric baseboard heaters were so expensive to run that we spent the first winter in two rooms, which we heated with a wood stove. The foundation of our home was made of soft brick, crumbling in places, allowing easy entry to cold winds and rodents. One extremely large creature traveled up inside the wall, and took up residence directly over our bed, scratching and keeping us awake each night. We attacked that rat with every trap, poison, and potion known to man, but he didn't leave his perch until the next spring. It was a testament to love that knows no bounds that my wife stuck with me for the three years we lived there.

When our second child was on the way, we purchased a house that was warmer, but sat above a basement that filled with water after every heavy dew. There was also the disapproval of my grandfather to deal with. He didn't think that any farmer should live in town, even a very small town like the one where this house was located. Grandpa finally came to visit only because it was the only way he could see his youngest great-grandchild.

Our third home came painted in a color scheme redolent of the 1970s drug culture. No surprise, as the previous resident ended up spending a hitch in the state penitentiary for some illegal farm diversification. This house was in the country, which pleased my grandfather, but it was built with used lumber, leaving our ceilings only seven and a half feet tall. Over the years we reroofed the house, added a couple of bedrooms, central air, a porch, new siding, and a redone kitchen.

But my wife and I have long nursed a dream, one that involves high ceilings, beautiful woodwork, formal gardens, and enough bookshelves to hold all of my books. On a lark, we toured a house for sale in Tarkio, which turned out to have three stories, solid oak wainscoting, pocket doors, and beautiful wood floors. The two-acre lot looked like a bare palette for my wife's horticultural passions. It had a huge porch ideal for the kind of lavish hanging baskets only someone running a greenhouse business like ours can afford. After a thorough 15-minute discussion, we bought the house.

We are now violating an even deeper family taboo. When I was about 14, my grandfather gave me a memorable object lesson. He took me by the home that my great-grandfather had built on a farm 30 miles from where we live now. That home stretched my ancestor financially to the point that he eventually lost his farm trying to pay for it. My grandfather took that lesson so seriously that he lived in a rented house without running water until he was almost 60. He and my grandmother did finally build a home, but it was a very modest ranch structure he no doubt paid for with cash.

In our family, capital has been used only for farmland and farm machinery for three generations. Our home loan will be the first mortgage in the family for nearly 100 years. The weight of the generations is on my shoulders, and it lies heavy.

We're excited about our new purchase, but the joy is tempered by the realization that my grandfather would not have been pleased. And not without some reason. Agriculture is, by its nature, a risky and capital-intensive business. Government estimates for the next decade place farming at the top of a dubious list: the occupation likely to experience the sharpest job losses. Grandpa had little formal education, but he was wise. In most things, including his frugality, he was absolutely right. Julie and I realize that we're risking the progress of 25 years of extremely hard work.

But Julie and I love old things, structures built to last, and style (the house is a Queen Anne, as near as we can tell). Our town is declining in population, and our new house needs owners who will care for her, and help preserve a time when Tarkio was growing and gracious,

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Working Lunch

Wisdom…is social. She seeks her fellows—Thomas Jefferson

How to Liberate Iraq

After becoming fascinated with the Middle East, Michael Rubin traveled widely and worked in the region, including a nine-month stint as a history teacher in Kurdish areas of Iraq. He became a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and then a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. TAE *senior editors Eli Lehrer and Karina Rollins conducted this interview just before Mr. Rubin assumed a new job as an Iran/Iraq researcher at the Pentagon.*

TAE: What do people on the street in the Middle East think of the United States?

RUBIN: When you travel in a country like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran, what you hear is not criticism of the United States for meddling in their internal affairs, but criticism of the United States for *not* meddling in their internal affairs. The majority of people who live under dictators oppose them—99.5 percent of Iraqis would be against Saddam. His regime is based solely on fear. It would collapse like a house of cards if we pushed.

That doesn't mean that the Iraqis are pro-American. They are nationalistic. But they would welcome U.S. assistance so long as it didn't become overbearing. They would like America to help liberate their country, but they don't want the U.S. to stay there for ten years.

Friendship with the United States should mean something. We should reward Turkey for standing by us for 50 years. We shouldn't reward countries like the Sudan for stopping things they should never have been doing in the first place. Just because Saudi Arabia has oil doesn't mean we should turn a blind eye to its support for terrorism. The Saudis must stop funding terrorists.

TAE: What was it like going to Iraq and Iran? How did you get in?

RUBIN: I first went to Iraq in September of 2000. I tried to go in 1998 but they wouldn't give me a visa. It's a common strategy in the Middle East: Governments make foreign academics very dependent on them. If your research depends on access to Syria or Iran or Iraq, and you need to do primary research at these locations to get tenure, these countries can hold a visa over your head. So there's a lot of academic self-censorship in the United States.

TAE: You've also spent some time in Afghanistan. What was that like?

RUBIN: I was in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, but I had to leave in a hurry when the Taliban attacked. One of the reasons I went to Afghanistan was to find out whether a lot of what we were hearing about the Taliban was true. They *were* bastards when it comes to human rights, but it wasn't the medieval situation you see represented by the National Organization for Women. In the countryside women weren't wearing veils; they worked.

The Taliban had lost control of al-Qaeda. They were obsessed with defeating Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance, and Osama bin Laden had the only troops capable of fighting at night. The Taliban felt that their security depended on bin Laden holding Massoud at bay.

The Taliban regime was ended, like it should have been. Any regime that hosts terrorists that kill Americans should be ended by the United States government, whether it's in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Saudi Arabia. Right now, the word of the United States is meaningless abroad—when we don't back up our rhetoric with action it undermines the power of American diplomacy.

TAE: You've taught in Iraqi Kurdistan. Can we rely on the Kurdish rebels to support efforts to overthrow Saddam?

RUBIN: I most certainly think we can. There are two main groups in that region: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Both are generally pro-Western and pro-American. Recently the PUK has been a much more consistent ally for us. Together they have a total of about 70,000 troops under their command and control an area about twice the size of New Jersey. Under the same sanctions that have been imposed on the rest of Iraq their homeland has a rising fertility rate and a healthier economy. They are not separatists; they see themselves as part of Iraq. They want to have some say in a central government in Baghdad, but they still celebrate Iraqi Army Day as a national holiday.

TAE: How would you imagine a new regime in Iraq?

RUBIN: Iraqi dissidents talk with reasonable consensus about a federal Iraq. There are 18 provinces in Iraq. You could take the country's common resources like oil and divide up the revenue according to the population in each province. Then let every elected provincial governor and every provincial legislature

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BookTalk

THE CENTER DIDN'T HOLD

By Philip Langdon

Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-1950
By Robert M. Fogelson
Yale University Press, 493 pages, $35



At first I simply couldn't believe this book's subtitle. Had American downtowns already "fallen" by 1950? If you'd ridden the passenger trains into Cleveland and disembarked at the impressive Terminal Tower in the early 1960s, as my parents and I used to do twice a year from western Pennsylvania, the idea that downtown was passé would have seemed absurd.

Lines of buses belching diesel exhaust —to my small-town sensibility, the very odor of urbanity—ran continually along Euclid Avenue, transporting legions of people to the offices, department stores, theaters, and other attractions of downtown Cleveland.

But after finishing Robert Fogelson's carefully constructed history of American cities, it's clear to me that the MIT professor, author of several earlier books on urban topics, is right. The nineteenth-century idea of a downtown—a single hub around which an entire metropolis revolves—began to lose force before WW II, and is not going to be revived.

Fogelson emphasizes that from the late 1800s into the 1920s, downtown was not just *a* center; it was *the* center. It was where offices clustered, where stores concentrated, where theaters and pleasure spots lit up the night, where cultural pursuits brought out the cultivated and the curious. The suburbs offered no competition to the energy of downtown.

Downtown achieved its preeminence because America valued physical proximity. Large-scale enterprises, which emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century, needed specialized professional and business services, and those required a compact central place. Transportation systems converged on downtown, ensuring that it would be a convenient location for merchandisers, entertainment impresarios, and other orchestrators of metropolitan life.

There was a strong belief in what Fogelson calls "spatial harmony"—the idea that the crowded downtown and the lower-intensity outer districts would never fight each other. City dwellers frequently complained about annoyances such as slow-moving streetcars and noisy, unsightly elevated railways, but they accepted the idea of a metropolis made up of two mutually dependent parts connected by mass transit.

Incredible as it now seems, many city dwellers in the early twentieth century did not take pride in the modern city's most visible achievement, the ambitious, upward-thrusting skyline. Critics derided skyscrapers as "eyesores." Boston, dependably conservative in many of its instincts, decreed that buildings must rise no higher than 125 feet. By contrast, New York rejected height limits and instead enacted the zoning ordinance of 1916, which required buildings to taper back as they rose—thus creating a strikingly energetic and beautiful silhouette.

Which approach was better—New York's or Boston's? I wish Fogelson had offered more of a verdict, because the issue has been revisited in recent years by Leon Krier, the godfather of neo-traditional architecture, who argues that buildings only a few stories high make a much more habitable city. Perhaps Boston's attempt to retain a low- to medium-height urban fabric, though eventually compromised, is one of the reasons the Massachusetts capital now ranks among the most enjoyable and thriving big cities in the U.S.

Fogelson astutely identifies the many false notions that have periodically clouded urban thinking. One was that expressways would be good for cities because they would help people reach the center. In fact, expressways consume so much land that they are inherently at odds with dense cities. Fogelson points out that it would take "roughly 20 four-lane elevated highways to move as many people as one two-track subway." Instead of saving the cities, expressways literally paved the way for the suburban exodus.

Tenement-house regulation and demolition, which had avid supporters early in the century, eliminated the worst housing offenses, Fogelson says, "but

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raised the cost of construction, by as much as 10 to 15 percent in Boston, so that far from stimulating the production of much-needed new housing, they deterred it." The idea of "spatial harmony" turned out to be patently false. By the 1930s, the outer districts of cities rebelled against the downtown interests, refusing to support center-city proposals such as new subway lines.

The departure of much of the old business base, the middle-class migration to independent suburban communities, the arrival of impoverished and poorly educated rural blacks, and the shift of decision-making to the federal level ultimately made it difficult for cities to right themselves. The New Deal, though it initially benefited cities, poured federal money into building the infrastructure of the South and West, eventually making it easy for companies to leave high-wage Northeastern and Midwestern cities behind.

Yet the story is not over. Downtowns are now re-envisioned as places where people live. Colleges and universities are infusing round-the-clock vitality into formerly 9-to-5 areas like Chicago's South Loop. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proved that big cities can be orderly.

Nonetheless, Fogelson is right. Downtown is only one of many centers in today's spread-out metropolis. This book tells, in fascinating detail, how that once-unthinkable situation came about.

TAE *contributing writer Philip Langdon is associate editor of* New Urban News.

DEMOCRATS RISING?

By George Marlin

The Emerging Democratic Majority
By John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira
Scribner, 213 pages, $24

In 1969, political analyst Kevin Phillips announced that a new coalition of voters was emerging that would end "New Deal Democratic hegemony" and create a Republican/conservative lock on the electoral college for years to come.

Sure enough, repulsed by the flower children rioting in the streets and their Democratic allies, southern Protestants, working-class urban Catholics, and rural westerners flocked to the Republican party. These voters turned to Richard Nixon in 1972 when he ran against "acid, amnesty, and abortion." In 1980 they gave Ronald Reagan a decisive mandate to downsize government, cut taxes, and defeat communism.

In a new book, *The Emerging Democratic Majority*, liberal analysts John Judis and Ruy Teixeira now argue that the conservative national majority is disintegrating, and that a new coalition committed to the Democratic party is rising.

The offspring of many World War II-era cultural conservatives have left ethnic city neighborhoods and rural areas for suburbia. Having achieved upper-middle class status, some are embarrassed by the traditional moral beliefs of their forefathers. According to Judis and Teixeira, this emerging class of metropolitan professionals is joining blacks, Hispanics, and working women in an embrace of "progressive" politics that will guarantee the Democratic party a national electoral majority.

In my home state of New York, the traditionally Republican suburban counties surrounding New York City have been flooded over the last generation with socially liberal professionals who are changing the political demographics. In 1998, Chuck Schumer beat three-term incumbent U.S. Senator Al D'Amato by making dramatic inroads in suburban areas. Schumer actually received 47 percent of the vote in D'Amato's home county on Long Island. Two years later, Hillary Clinton whipped Rick Lazio by carrying even affluent Westchester County and the upstate Republican stronghold of Onondaga County.

Democrats show rising strength in metropolitan regions where "the production of ideas and services has either



re-defined or replaced assembly-line manufacturing," state the authors. Artisans, musicians, craftsmen, and technology experts often support liberal social and environmental causes, and are becoming more numerous as America becomes richer.

Judis and Teixeira analyze 263 metro counties that Reagan carried with a cumulative 55 percent of the vote. In 2000, Gore carried these same regions by 55 percent to Bush's 41 percent. If these trends continue, the Democrats will indeed command the 270 electoral votes needed to control the White House.

Judis and Teixeira haven't come up with an airtight case. Two possible scenarios could upset their prognostications. First, many Democrats elected as centrists could revert to their true colors and start promoting big-government schemes that would put off suburbanites. Bill Clinton's shift to the left after his election as a "New Democrat"—marked by a proposed nationalization of health insurance, abandonment of his pledge to cut middle class taxes, and his championing of gays in the military—permitted the Republicans to gain control of both houses of Congress in 1994.

Another alternative to a Democratic control depends on great efforts by Republicans, but I'm not sure they're up to it. Throughout the urban deserts of America's inner cities are patches of green: stretches of tidy, well-kept houses populated by new immigrants and civic-minded minority citizens committed to family, education, self-discipline, and hard work. These new Americans—Koreans, Hispanics, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and Middle Easterners—are repopulating abandoned communities,

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improving dreadful schools, and building productive businesses and neighborhood shops. If the Republican party is to counterbalance the growth of natural Democratic constituencies, it must reach out to these individuals. The Republican party must become a part of their lives, and promote their beliefs and interests, from City Hall to Washington. Conservatives must prove again, in the words of Michael Novak, that a "politics based on family and neighborhood is far stronger socially and psychologically than a politics based on bureaucracy."

If Republicans try to imitate Democrats by buying off the leaders of these communities with political plums, they will fail—because they can never outspend or outpromise the Democrats. Instead, they must convince these voters that their future success as citizens rests with basic Republican principles. By making inroads in urban communities, Republicans could offset Democratic suburban gains and maintain electoral competitiveness. Such a strategy could make the difference in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and other states that George W. Bush lost in 2000.

If Republicans fail, Judis and Teixeira will be hailed as prophets of the new political order dominating American life.

George J. Marlin is author of Fighting the Good Fight: The History of New York's Conservative Party.

THE FRONTIER FED EX

By Bill Croke

Stagecoach: Wells Fargo and the American West
By Philip L. Fradkin
Simon and Schuster, 250 pages, $27.50

One of the certainties of American life is the perennial inefficiency of the U.S. Post Office. In the nineteenth-century West, mail delivery could take months. That left an opening for the



private Wells Fargo delivery service, similar to the niches occupied by UPS and FedEx today. In *Stagecoach*, former *Los Angeles Times* reporter Philip Fradkin presents a history of the legendary express and banking enterprise.

Henry Wells and William Fargo became partners in 1845. Their delivery company started off servicing small cities and farm hamlets in upstate New York. As America's railroads spread through the East, the two entrepreneurs decided to seek virgin territory across the Mississippi. The 1849 California Gold Rush offered them a perfect opportunity. Wells Fargo stagecoaches delivered to mining camps scattered all across the Sierra Nevada mountains. The true mark of a new town's civic ascendancy in Gold Rush-era California was the opening of a Wells Fargo branch office.

Wells Fargo was also a partner with American Express in the ill-fated Pony Express, a mounted mail service that operated between St. Louis and Placerville, California for 18 months in 1860 and '61. A series of express riders covered the 2,000-mile route in 11 days. Fresh horses and men were provided at regular "way stations," though bandits and Indians occasionally harried the riders. At 15, William F. Cody—later known as Buffalo Bill—got his start as a Pony Express rider.

Though the Pony Express lost money, it blazed routes later traveled by stagecoaches carrying passengers, freight, and bullion—Wells Fargo's bread and butter. The legendary Concord coaches manufactured in New Hampshire to ingenious Yankee designs were made specifically for speedy travel over rough roads. Rewards prompted drivers to break speed records, and tight logistics eventually permitted a traveler to go from St. Louis to San Francisco in 24 days.

The young Samuel Clemens traveled the route in 1861 in the company of his older brother Orion, heading to a job as secretary to the new governor of Nevada. Sam went along for the adventure, and for material to feed his literary aspirations. He ended the journey as a Nevada newspaperman, writing as Mark Twain.

continued on page 58

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

Jim Hawkins climbs the rigging in *Treasure Planet.*

Buena Vista Pictures Marketing

How do you extol the value of hard work and personal sacrifice to today's kids without boring them to tears? The same way Robert Louis Stevenson did in the early 1880s: by weaving moral instruction into a rousing adventure tale. In fact, why not just borrow Stevenson's original story, adding plenty of modern touches to keep things fresh?

That's what Disney has done with *Treasure Planet*, a free yet thematically faithful animated adaptation of Stevenson's classic adventure novel, *Treasure Island.* As the title indicates, this version isn't set on the high seas of the eighteenth century but in the vast expanses of outer space. Here Jim Hawkins is a scrappy teen who regularly gets stopped for speeding on his "solarsurfer," while Long John Silver is a cyborg with a mechanical arm. The reworking goes on from there, but the original story's intent remains.

The driving element of *Treasure Planet*, like that of its predecessor, is the maturation of young Jim (voiced by Joseph Gordon-Levitt). Left without a male role model (his father abandoned the family years ago), Jim leads a restless, aimless existence that has him destined for juvenile hall. And so when he and Dr. Delbert Doppler, an astrophysicist friend of his mother's, discover a map to the legendary *Treasure Planet*, Doppler sees an opportunity for "a few character-building months in space."

Just what is the movie's vision of character building? An invigorating daily regimen of chores, and the demand that you respect your elders. The captain of the ship Doppler charters—a cat-like alien with the crisp, proper enunciation of Emma Thompson—demands that Jim pull his weight, and assigns him to work with the ship's cook, John Silver.

Silver puts Jim to his first true test, burdening him with endless tasks in the ship's galley. At first the boy protests, but during one of the few musical montages we see him dig in and do everything that was asked of him. Silver is so impressed he considers Jim to be an equal member of the crew, which reinforces the film's message that hard work earns respect.

In these scenes, *Treasure Planet* also stays true to the conflicted nature of Silver, a character who remains Stevenson's stroke of genius and one of the most inspired antiheroes of classic literature. Although he masterminds the mutiny set to take place once the ship reaches its destination, Silver has a code of honor. His protective affection for Jim extends to the point that Silver becomes a father figure to the boy. This bond allows the movie to make its boldest statement, about self-sacrifice, when during the climax Silver is forced to choose between saving the treasure he has sought for so long and saving Jim's life.

The Disney animators, led by veteran directors Ron Clements and John Musker, communicate such matters in grand visual terms. Silver, voiced by Brian Murray, is given particular attention: When he meets Jim and reaches out to shake the boy's hand, his mechanical arm at first extends a collection of daggers and knives before reconfiguring into the shape of a fist. It's a clever, ominous touch that hints at the pirate's dual personalities.

Other visual elements are strictly window dressing, though no less enjoyable. Rather than the deep, dark backgrounds usually used to represent outer space, these canvases are dotted with wispy clouds and soft colors, much like an evening sky above an endless sea. The spaceships, for their part, are based on nautical designs—only here the sails are powered by solar rays, not wind. It makes for a delightfully anachronistic visual palette, one in which cannons that shoot laser balls make perfect sense.

Is *Treasure Planet* a worthy replacement for Robert Louis Stevenson's original? Hardly. Yet during a time when his novel's traditional values have lost their prominence in contemporary culture, it's nice to have this cinematic reminder. The medium may have drastically changed with *Treasure Planet*, but what's important is that the message remains the same.

—Josh Larsen

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Edited by Eli Lehrer

the Digest

Summaries of important new research from the nation's universities, think tanks, and investigative publications

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ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

Not Stocks Alone

John Makin, "After Irrational Exuberance," in *Economic Outlook*, American Enterprise Institute, September 2002 (aei.org)

During the go-go stock market of the 1990s, financial advisors, media figures, and academics urged Americans to put more money into stocks. Since the stock market began a precipitous decline in early 2000, however, some have questioned the wisdom of investing an increasingly large percentage of the national wealth in equities. AEI resident scholar John Makin argues that investors have become too caught up in buying stocks and ought to purchase more bonds instead.

"The problem with the incessant push for the public to buy equities," he writes, "is that it ultimately leads to lower returns"—because bonds will outperform stocks in specific circumstances. Yet most brokerage firms have a vested financial interest in pushing stocks over other types of assets, Makin points out.

While Makin doesn't dispute the notion that stocks have typically outperformed bonds in the long run, he points out that bonds can offer higher returns in many specific cases. Since 2000, for example, the S&P 500 index has declined 32 percent, while long-term U.S. government bonds have risen 29 percent. He observes that bonds rarely have the brokerage or management fees associated with stocks and equity-heavy mutual funds.

In addition, Makin points out, "stock prices may fall at inconvenient times—such as the years close to or in one's retirement, or just before college tuition bills come due." Makin urges investors to protect themselves from market downturns by also holding asset classes other than stock. "Markets tend to go down faster than they go up," he warns, "and there is no reason to suppose that investing most of one's funds in the stock market will speed up the process of recouping losses suffered over the past few years."

Make Money With the Poor

C. K. Prahalad and Allan Hammond, "Serving the World's Poor, Profitably," in *Harvard Business Review*, September 2002 (hbr.com)

Shantytowns and ghettos across our planet house nearly 4 billion people subsisting on less than $2,000 per year. Despite their lack of income, however, the world's poor represent a vast untapped market for profit-making business. C. K. Prahalad, a University of Michigan business professor, and Allan Hammond, who works for the World Resources Institute, argue that companies could realize significant profits by working harder to serve people with very low incomes.

Barriers to sales to the poor are not insurmountable, Prahalad and Hammond claim. Among their points:

The poor have untapped purchasing power: Although family incomes are low, poor people must still buy everything from food to transport services. High population densities produce lots of spending money even in shantytowns.

Prices are too high in poor areas: The authors compare one area of India with a Miami suburb and find that loans are 53 times more expensive in India, and water 37 times more costly. Even rice costs a few pennies more per pound. Competition from efficient multinational corporations could drive down prices while still providing handsome profits.

Costs can be lower in poor regions: Though building supply networks can be quite costly in the developing world, labor costs much less.

Opportunities for innovation abound: Low household incomes force companies to introduce ever-cheaper products. Unusual languages, geographies, and cultures can lead to innovations that can later be sold to wealthy customers as well.

Prahalad and Hammond emphasize that doing business in the developing world does not require a desire to help the disadvantaged; only the will to make money. "It is simply good business strategy," the authors write, "to be involved in large, untapped markets that offer new consumers, cost-saving opportunities, and access to radical innovation."

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SOCIETY

Costly Medicine

Joseph Antos and Grace-Marie Turner, "What Congress Should do About Prescription Drugs for Seniors," *AEI on the Issues*, September 2002 (aei.org)

The U.S. Senate and House are struggling to agree on a workable proposal for helping senior citizens pay for medications through Medicare —the national health insurance program for the elderly. Joseph Antos, an AEI fellow, and Grace-Marie Turner, who heads the Galen Institute, put forward their own proposal—Prescription Drug Security (PDS)—as an alternative to the wide range of bills circulating on the House and Senate floors.

Under PDS, low-income beneficiaries would receive a debit card—in effect a voucher—allowing them to purchase up to $600 worth of prescription drugs per year. Wealthier Medicare beneficiaries would buy their own debit cards, an expense they could deduct from their taxes. Catastrophic insurance would cover individuals with high drug costs above the uniform annual level, and private companies would compete to manage the benefit. The system would supplement policies that some individuals already purchase piecemeal.

The overwhelming majority of low- and middle-income individuals would save money with this plan. Wealthy beneficiaries would pay more, but regulatory reforms might be used to expand their choices.

At a cost of $302 billion over ten years, PDS would not be cheap. But it would cost less than many other prescription drug plans currently floating around Congress. The plan would also lay the groundwork for future market-based reforms of Medicare, argue Antos and Turner, while providing immediate "meaningful help for low-income seniors who do not have access to drug coverage."

Baby-Step Toward School Choice?

Lowell Weicker et al., *Divided We Fail: Coming Together Through Public School Choice*, The Century Foundation, September 2002 (tcf.org)

A report from a task force assembled by a liberal think tank suggests that letting students choose among public schools represents the best path to improved education, economic integration, and academic achievement among low-income children.

The task force, led by former Connecticut governor Lowell Weicker, places most of its emphasis on what its members term "controlled choice." Under their proposal, every school in a defined geographic area—usually about a third or a half of a big-city school district—would have to compete for students. To provide socio-economic balance, the composition of each school is required to reflect the demographics of the area it draws from. Siblings of students already enrolled in a school and people who live within walking distance would receive preference to attend that institution.

In areas where limited choice of this sort has been introduced—like Cambridge, Massachusetts and Wake County, North Carolina—test scores and parent satisfaction have improved.

The task force identifies several benefits to this approach:

Schools become more accountable: Forced to compete for students, public school principals and teachers will have to innovate and impose high standards.

Parents have more options: Nobody would be compelled to attend a given school, yet families who want to send their children to a neighborhood institution would usually still be able to.

Achievement improves for low-income students: Low-income students do better when they attend schools where middle-class students make up a majority. That would be more common under wider public school choice.

SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT

Progress Against Drugs

Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), *National Survey of American Attitudes on Substance Abuse VII: Teens, Parents, and Siblings*, Columbia University, August 2002 (www.casacolumbia.org)

A Columbia University research center has found that drug use is declining in schools, and that parents and siblings can make a big difference when it comes to keeping kids away from controlled substances. The research center, CASA, surveyed 1,000 teens and 541 parents about their attitudes and experience relating to substance abuse.

Much of the news is good. Indeed, 62 percent of students surveyed said that drugs were not present in their schools. That is double the percentage saying so just four years ago. Drinking is also down: 57 percent of the teenagers surveyed said they never drink, while only 7 percent get drunk twice a month or more often. A few gloomy statistics do surface: CASA found that teens find marijuana easier to obtain than alcohol.

The survey found that siblings play an important role in drug use patterns. Teens who say their older brothers or sisters would be "very angry" to discover they were using marijuana were substantially less likely to abuse the drug than teens whose elder siblings took a more relaxed view of the issue. Twelve percent of teens with an older brother or sister report that the sibling encouraged them to use drugs. Someone who lives with such a person is almost twice as likely to smoke, drink, or use drugs as the average teen.

Parents, CASA finds, view the drug problem more pessimistically than they should. More than a third of parents think they have no power over their children when it comes to substance abuse. Fully 43 percent of parents predict their teen is likely to use drugs in the future, even though only 16 percent of teens said so.

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And it turns out that teens whose parents think future drug use is "very likely" are three times likelier to smoke, drink, or use illegal drugs than those whose parents say future drug use is "not likely at all."

The survey points to a brightening climate for teens when it comes to substance abuse, but one that their parents often do not know about. —*Iain Murray*

OTHER COUNTRIES

Ready for War

Dany Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," in the *Middle East Quarterly,* Fall 2002 (meforum.org/meq/)

Syria has gathered a large arsenal of chemical weapons and is preparing to use them, and has also made some progress on developing biological weapons. Writing in the *Middle East Quarterly*, Israeli academic Dany Shoham finds that Syria has, among other things:

Purchased ballistic missiles: Syria owns a sizeable arsenal of Scud missiles and has constructed an underground network of tunnels in which to store its weapons.

Acquired VX nerve gas: Syria has learned to produce VX nerve gas, a lethal poison. President Bashar Assad's government is experimenting with mass dispersion mechanisms.

Performed threatening tests: In July of 2001, Syria drove a Scud-B missile to Israel's border in order to show that it could strike Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and other Israeli population centers.

Made progress on developing biological weapons: Syria still couldn't launch a biological attack, but it has many of the tools needed to begin development.

Shoham concludes that Syria is a major threat to Israel. The sole feasible target of its large-scale testing of weapons of mass destruction is the Jewish state.

—*Kristen Dennis*

BOOKTALK *continued from page 54*

Fradkin also tells how *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley rode the stage west in 1859, enduring the dust, lack of sleep, bone-aching jolts, and bad food at way stations. Writing with his typically jaundiced eye, Greeley commented on one landscape that "if Uncle Sam should ever sell that tract for one cent per acre, he will swindle the purchaser outrageously." The man who famously editorialized "Go west, young man" detested the "desolation" of what he saw from his stage window, and made his return trip from San Francisco via steamship.

By the 1860s, Wells Fargo was the main carrier of bullion mined in the West. One record-breaking day in 1864 saw the company haul three tons of silver bullion from the mines of Virginia City, Nevada alone. As stage robbery became popular Wells Fargo devoted considerable resources to security precautions. But even armed guards didn't stop desperadoes from hitting remote coaches. From 1870 to 1884 Wells Fargo suffered 378 robberies and burglaries, resulting in 33 deaths, 240 court convictions, and losses of $928,000—$16 million in current value.

The company's dogged security policy was that "Wells Fargo never forgets" offenses against its prosperity. James Hume, for 30 years the company's tough and efficient chief of security, relentlessly tracked down Wells Fargo robbers. His wiliest fugitive, "Black Bart," an intelligent elderly gentleman, robbed 28 stages in eight years, disguising himself and always escaping afoot, making it difficult to track him. Hume finally nabbed him living a genteel life in San Francisco, and sent him to prison. At a time when there was no FBI, Wells Fargo provided the best crime statistics on the American West.

Wells Fargo is lucky to have its story told by Philip Fradkin in great form.

Bill Croke is a writer in Cody, Wyoming.

IN REAL LIFE *continued from page 50*

and life moved at a slower speed. We'll take care of the house, grow gardens that are the envy of the neighbors, and finally have a place to entertain our rapidly growing extended family.

I once helped my grandfather remove a fence made of wire so old and rusty that it broke at the touch. Guess what: Grandpa set out to reuse that wire. When I asked him how old the wire was, he didn't know, because it was already used when he'd first strung it up in 1931.

We'll work hard to rid ourselves of debt, of course. In the meantime, I'm banking on the hope that Grandpa would be somewhat mollified by the fact that we're spending all this money to preserve a house that was built a hundred years ago. In the family tradition, that's got to count for something.

TAE *contributing writer Blake Hurst hunted for lots of furniture in antique shops this fall.*

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Opinion Pulse

Edited by Karlyn Bowman

European Views

Europeans favor a stronger role for government on social welfare issues than do Americans. In some areas such as education and crime, both populations want an active government. Questions about the proper level of defense spending produce stark differences between the continents.

Question: Now I'll read a list of things that have been mentioned as things the government has responsibility to do for citizens. For each, please tell me whether you think...? Please tell me if...



Source: Princeton Survey Research Associates (U.S.), Market & Opinion Research International (U.K.), IFOP (France), EMNID (Germany), Pragma (Italy), Demoscopia (Spain) for Americans Discuss Social Security, 1997.

Question: Now I am going to read a list of government programs. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you feel it should be...



Source: Market & Opinion Research International in Europe, Harris Interactive in the United States for the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, summer 2002.

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In Europe, opposition to biotechnology outweighs support. Still, the surveys reveal contradictory impulses. Seventy-one percent of Europeans say they don't want genetically modified food, but an even larger majority want to decide for themselves what they buy. Economic globalization isn't high on the European list in terms of extremely critical threats over the next ten years. Despite complaints, most Europeans want the United States to exert strong leadership in world affairs.

Question: Overall, would you say you...?



Source: Market & Opinion Research International in Europe, Harris Interactive in the United States for the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, summer 2002.

Question: Would you say you are ... with each of the following propositions on genetically modified foods?



Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer, May–June 2001.

Question: I am going to read you a list of possible threats to the vital interests of (your country) in the next ten years. For each one, please tell me if you see this as...?



Source: Market & Opinion Research International in Europe, Harris Interactive in the United States for the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, summer 2002.

Question: From your point of view, how desirable is ...?



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Europe on Europe

Europeans differ about whether membership in the European Union is a plus for their country. They differ on the single currency and on whether the E.U. should be expanded to include new countries. When asked specifically about expanding NATO to include former Eastern European countries and Russia, majorities agree. Most people thought the introduction of the euro went smoothly, and it made them feel more like Europeans.

Question: Generally speaking, do you support...?



Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer, spring 2002.

In the German Marshall Fund/Chicago Council of Foreign Relations 2002 survey, 53 percent of Europeans surveyed favored expansion of NATO to include Romania; 57 percent, Slovakia; 55 percent Bulgaria; 56 percent, Slovenia; 61 percent, the Baltic States; and 60 percent, Russia. More than 60 percent in all the countries surveyed said that NATO was "still essential" to their country's security. Fifty-six percent of those surveyed in the United States agreed.

Question: Do you think that, generally speaking, here in (my country)...?



Question: Could you tell me for the following sentence, if you ...?

Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer, spring 2002.

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the Mail

I enjoyed Michael Ledeen's excellent and thoughtful piece on Bobby Knight ("The Real Bobby Knight," October/November). Ledeen's depiction of Knight captures his character and personality far more accurately than do the mainstream media. One point that Ledeen drives home is that Knight's staunchest critics hardly ever apply the same criticisms to any other coach.

Purdue University coach Gene Keady, for example, is notorious for leaping from his chair, tossing his jacket on the court, and working himself into a state of rage that few coaches ever exhibit. But Knight, unlike most coaches, is politically controversial. That explains why Knight's critics have hounded him relentlessly while remaining silent about his colleagues.

Kevin Lamb
Managing Editor, Human Events

I am appalled by Michael Ledeen's preposterous claim that Bobby Knight was "subjected to a 'Borking' as harsh and unfair as that experienced by any political figure in America," and that his downfall was the result of his unwillingness to kowtow to journalists or "political correctness." Journalists and the politically correct Left commit plenty of sins, but let's save such rhetoric for the real ones. It is true that Bobby Knight's virtues are considerable. But his own flaws brought him down.

Knight compiled a three-decade record of repeated failures to show the maturity and sportsmanship his position demands. For me his worst abuse was when he took his team off the floor during a game against the Russian National Team. He didn't like the officiating, so he preferred to forfeit the game. This gave Indiana University's student body an unforgettable lesson in sportsmanship.

James W. Fox
Fairfax, Virginia

Scott Gottlieb advocates the right of private individuals to be vaccinated against smallpox (SCAN, "Smallpox, Big Risk," September). The government currently prohibits this. He is wrong and the government right.

The problem with live virus vaccines —the only kind we have for smallpox right now—is that recipients not only accept a risk to themselves, but impose the risk on others. Some of them will get sick and could spread the infection. True, the rate of contagion from smallpox vaccine is low: Of every million people who get the vaccine, only about 30 would become contagious. Nevertheless, given the potentially serious consequences, the government is correct in prohibiting individuals from receiving the vaccine.

Peter Borregard
Berkeley, California

In the October/November OPINION PULSE Karlyn Bowman writes that "Divided control of government in Washington has been the rule for most of the past 50 years." This is misleading. The reality is, divided control has benefited one side disproportionately.

To begin with, the proper watershed is not the 50 years since Eisenhower, but the 70 years since Franklin Roosevelt established the modern Democratic Party. Since then, Democrats have had undivided control of the government for 32 years, while Republicans have had such control for only three.

The rest of the time, we have generally had Democratic control of the legislature under Republican Presidents. There have not been four consecutive years with a Republican President, House, and Senate since 1930.

Two cheers for four years of completely Republican government before another 72 years go by.

Norman Henry
Colchester, Vermont

Blake Hurst's "Calamity in Klamath" (October/November) is an excellent account of the plight of the westerners who settled on what was once government land. (In that part of the country, what wasn't?) The West's environmental problems stem from radical environmentalists and the bureaucrats at the Fish and Wildlife Service.

These groups simply want to return all the land to the government. People like the farmers in Klamath are getting better organized to fight, but thanks to various radical groups they are still getting picked off one at a time throughout the West.

Toby Elster
Wichita, Kansas

The American Enterprise welcomes your comments. Send e-mail to tae@aei.org. Or write "The Mail," The American Enterprise, 1150 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Or fax (202) 862-5867. Please include your address and phone number. Published letters may be edited for length and clarity.

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

"We find the defendant not not guilty."

"At the tone, please leave your e-mail address."

"I got you a muscle shirt. The rest is up to you."

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

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

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